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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the dynamics of bank capital base and funding structure before,
during and after the latest financial crisis. The data used in this study contains banks
from  the  US,  UK  and  26  European  countries:  Austria,  Belgium,  Cyprus,  Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The whole
sample includes 6927 individual banks from these countries. Sample period captures the
years from 2004 to 2012 and is divided into three sub periods: pre crisis, crisis and post
crisis. The first period contains years 2004-2006, the second 2007-2009 and the third
2010-2012. Fixed effects panel estimation with OLS estimator for variable coefficients
is employed in order to execute empirical tests.
According to the empirical findings banks tend to increase their capital under good
economic conditions. Raising capital is not costly during economic expansion as
suggested by theories and previous empirical research. On the other hand during crises
and post crisis periods raising capital becomes costly process. Therefore, the coefficient
of GDP growth becomes negative in post crisis time. Other findings suggest that bank
size, short-term funding and interest rates have a negative impact on the capital ratio in
all times. Net income and non-interest income have a positive impact on the capital
ratio. Loan loss reserves also have a positive impact on the capital ratio; however it is
significant  only  under  good  economic  conditions,  i.e.  during  the  first  sub  period.  The
findings suggest that long-term funding has been affected by the crisis more. Because of
rising uncertainty banks were unable to receive much long-term funding. The results
show that Scandinavian countries suffered less from the crisis. These countries were
able to maintain sufficient capital ratio during the crisis. Main limitations of this study
are the studied geographical area and applied methodology. More advanced method
such as GMM estimation can be applied in further studies.
KEYWORDS: Capital & funding structure, Banks, Financial crisis
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91. INTRODUCTION
The recent global financial crisis raised many questions about banks’ performance,
corporate governance, risk taking and their preparedness to such crises and recessions.
Most of the economists agree that this was the worst crisis after Great Depression of
1929-1933. Furthermore, there were rising blames to banks by public, who thought that
banks were responsible for this crisis. The issue was discussed widely by economists
and  politicians,  and  most  of  the  opinions  were  agreeing  at  one  point  that  banks  must
“pay the bill” for the crisis. International Monetary Fund proposed to introduce two new
taxes for banks of G-20 countries. The proposal was discussed widely but was not
accepted by most of the governments of G-20 countries. Only the European Union
suggested that they could take into account the proposal separately. However, the
decision about new taxes has not been made so far. (Goedde-Menke, Langer, Pfingsten
2013, Brunnermeier 2009)
Along with these discussions, the compensations payable to CEOs of banks during and
after the crisis were also debated widely. Many scholars, governments and general
public argued that it is unacceptable to pay high bonuses for CEOs under these harsh
economic conditions. Moreover, they argued that it is unethical to pay high bonuses and
that the bonuses should be spent to help overcome the crisis. Recently, the European
Union agreed to cut the executives’ compensations by applying new legislation.
However,  countries  with  liberal  economies  like  US  and  UK  do  not  seem  willing  to
apply this legislation because they do not want to intervene to free economic choices of
the banks. Generally, all the arguments in this topic support the idea that, current
compensation payment systems motivate executives to focus more on the performance
in the short-term rather than long-term. This, in turn caused the “bubble” in issued loans
in  order  to  get  more  compensation.  This  issue  is  also  related  to  the  risk  taking  of  the
banks. Hence high compensation promises causes more risky decisions, and therefore
banks become more vulnerable to economic conditions. (Raviv and Sisli-Ciamarra
2013, Dong 2013)
All these developments and discussions about banks extremely raised the interest in this
topic in recent years. How banks behaved before and during crisis? How they act after
the crisis? Did they learn from the crisis? These are the questions now to be answered in
order to get the picture of the current trends of banks behaviors.
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1.1.  Generic background
As discussed in introduction bonuses for better performance were the main source of
income for “front desk” bank employees in US before the subprime mortgage crisis
occurred. Majority of loan officers were motivated to issue as much loan as they can,
because their income depended on their loan portfolio. This attitude forced them to issue
loans even for subprime customers. Subprime customers are the customers with bad
credit history, who had some difficulties in paying back their loans in the past. Not only
the incentives by loan officers but also the stimulus by the managers to create large loan
portfolios had increased the number of issued subprime lending. Subprime lending
mainly focused on mortgages and created much risk for banks because of the amount of
loans issued. However, the process was not limited only with subprime lending. Thus
banks were trading asset backed securities with high risk which were related with
subprime customers, and external investors were not well informed about these
customers. They mainly relied on the information obtained from banks themselves and
rating agencies. However, further development of subprime crisis revealed the fact that
this information was not enough to measure the risk for the external investors. While the
amount of risky loans increased in early 2000s, banks and investors were taking high
risks on their shoulders. (Dong 2013, Kenc and Dibooglu 2010, Jagannathan, Kapoor,
Schaumburg 2013, Dwyer and Lothian 2012)
When majority of customers were unable to pay back their loans, the disturbances in the
US financial market started. This was also stimulated by falling housing prices in the
US. Customers realized that the value of their real estate is lower than they are obliged
to  pay  to  banks.  Therefore,  they  were  less  willing  to  pay  back  loans.  Mainly  the
incentives of subprime customers caused the increase in the amount of bad lending. This
in turn decreased the value of issued securities backed by mortgages. The process
employed such a number of financial institutions that, it turned to a nationwide crisis in
US. (Jagannathan et al. 2013)
The initial  signs of the subprime crisis turning to global one were observed when two
major banks Northern Rock and IKB Deutsche Industriebank have collapsed. Thereafter
major world economies USA, Switzerland, Canada and European Union announced
about their bailout policies in 2007. (Lin & Treichel 2012:12) Thus, subprime mortgage
crisis in US spread to the world as global financial crisis after 2007.
The financial crisis spread around the world, as major financial institutions have
collapsed and were taken over by the governments. The collapse of Lehman Brothers,
one  of  the  largest  US  investment  banking  companies,  led  to  some  chain  reaction
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processes.  This  was  the  worst  bankruptcy  record  in  US  history  for  the  amount  it
covered. Furthermore, the collapse of other major banks, investment and insurance
companies were resulted by their high risk taking attitudes as they were investing in
risky mortgage backed securities. (Lin & Treichel 2012)
All these developments lead to judge the effectiveness of regulation in financial sector,
mainly in banking sector.  As a result  new, stricter regulations came out,  and Basel III
regulation was implemented. Basel III intends to fortify banks’ capital requirements and
capital adequacy ratios in order to secure them in case of any future crises. In general,
Basel III intends to strengthen banks’ ability to overcome crises by increasing capital
requirements and liquidity.
Figure 1. Changes in TED Spread between January 1986-June 2013. (Source:
Macrotrends)
According to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III aims to introduce new
measures to improve regulation, risk management and control in banking sector. The
measures aim the followings:
· Improve banks’ capacity to overcome shocks evolving from economic and
financial instabilities,
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· Improve risk management and supervision
· Improve limpidity and release of information
Furthermore, BCBS claims that the purpose of these improvements in measures is first,
to  focus  attention  on  bank-level  regulation  which  will  increase  elasticity  of  banks  to
economic shocks. Secondly, it aims to cover systematic macroeconomic risks around
financial institutions. (BCBS 2011)
All these improvements in bank regulation and bailout and financial policies of
governments led the crisis to slow down and reduced its effects gradually. As a response
to these policies TED spread, proxy for financial instability, decreased significantly in
recent years. Measured as the difference between LIBOR and short-term US treasury
bills rate, TED spread is a good proxy for financial crises. As the difference between
these rates increases the riskiness of interbank lending also increases, while government
bonds  appear  to  be  less  risky.  (Cretien  2005)  Figure  1  shows  the  movement  of  TED
Spread from 1986 to 2013.
As it can be observed from the graph, TED Spread increased dramatically during crisis
time which indicates high riskiness of financial assets. According to the graph the years
between 2007 and 2009 were the worst years of the crisis. TED Spread turned to normal
after the end of 2009. This might indicate that uncertainty in financial markets has
reduced. However the world economy is still suffering from the aftermath of the worst
crisis of the last 70 years. Therefore, the research on the recent financial crisis is still
important and interesting for many scholars.
1.2. Purpose of the study, intended contributions and limitations
The motivation arising from abovementioned reasons leads to set the main purpose of
this study as to investigate whether and how the recent global financial crisis affected
capital base and funding structure of banks. Banks all around the world were lacking
financing  at  the  times  of  crisis;  therefore  it  is  expected  that  their  debt  structures  have
changed after the crisis. Intuitively, the crisis is supposed to affect the capital and
funding structure of banks. Since the regulations also changed and strengthened, they
have also affected the capital structure of banks significantly. Also the financing for
most of the banks became more difficult during the crisis, therefore the thesis also
intends to investigate if short-term financing have prevailed the long-term financing
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after the crisis. The crisis changed the future economic prospects and policies of banks.
As a result it is expected that banks are more interested to issue short term loans and
also investors are interested in making money in a significantly short period by
investing  in  less  risky  short-term  debts  after  crisis.  Moreover,  this  thesis  tries  to  find
which countries are affected from the crisis initially and which are affected in later
stages of the crisis. Obviously the United States is the first country to be affected from
the crisis. It is expected that the countries with highest integration with US were
affected by the crisis first. These are supposed to be the countries of Western Europe,
especially, UK, France and Germany. It is interesting to know which countries are
affected first in order to estimate the expected results of future crises.
Scandinavian countries have experienced banking crisis in near past in the years of
1988-1993. The crisis was not very severe for Denmark, and the country managed to
overcome it until 1990. However, it lasted until 1993 for Norway, Sweden and Finland.
Similar to the recent financial crisis, the crises in these countries occurred because of
the high amounts of bank lending during economic growth. This economic growth and
high credit and asset price growth were followed by economic recession, which lead to
high loan losses. As a result many banks experienced lack of financing and governments
of these countries intervened to bailout banking system. (Sandal 2004) Three most
important reasons of the Nordic banking crises according to Sandal (2004) are
· Strong credit and asset price boom
· Weak risk management
· Inadequate supervision and macroeconomic policies
These causes of the Nordic banking crisis are very similar to the causes of the recent
financial crisis. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether these countries were
wise enough during last global financial crisis, and if they suffered less than other
countries. It is expected that the recent crisis had shocked these countries in its later
stages and they were able to recover more quickly compared to other countries.
Intended contributions. A study in the dynamics of bank capital and funding structure
around crisis has not been carried out for a wider sample recently. This thesis is mainly
contributing to the existing literature by investigating the patterns of capital and funding
structure of 29 EU/EFTA countries and the US banks around latest financial crisis. The
second intended contribution of this thesis is to find the differences between the capital
structure of the banks of Scandinavian countries, particularly Denmark, Norway,
Sweden  and  Finland,  and  other  sample  countries  (excluding  the  US).  If  sufficient
evidence is found to prove less riskiness of Scandinavian banks in terms of capital
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buffers, general conclusions and further suggestions to apply Scandinavian banking
practices in other countries can be made. Finally, the last intended contribution of the
thesis is to find evidence for the speed of spread of the crisis among sample countries.
Limitations of the study. Major limitation of the thesis is the applied methodology. The
fixed effects panel estimation applied in the thesis does not allow to control for country
specific, bank specific and other factors because dummy variables are not applicable for
this estimation method. Another limitation of the thesis is the geographical area of
sample countries. Since the sample includes countries only from Europe and the US
general conclusions for all banks of the world cannot be made with the findings of this
thesis. It is important to extend sample and include at least significant countries from
each continents to draw general conclusions for the dynamics of bank capital structure
around crises. For more accurate empirical results advanced empirical methods such as
GMM estimation can be applied.
1.3.  Structure of the study
This thesis consists of seven chapters which investigate and explain mainly topics about
latest dynamics of bank capital and funding structure in a consecutive order. The first
chapter explains the main purposes of this study, summarizes previous research on the
bank capital structure, profitability and risk taking attitudes, and introduces the
hypotheses to be verified through empirical tests. The second chapter explains capital
structure theories, particularly Modigliani and Miller theory, Trade-off and Pecking
order theory of capital structure, and analyzes them from bank perspective. The third
chapter focuses on the bank capital and funding structure issues. It clarifies the
importance of the equity capital for safe and sound bank activities and explains funding
structure of banks. Moreover, it describes the regulations in banking industry and
explains the evolution of Basel Accord on Bank Regulation. Finally, the third chapter
identifies different bank regulation practices in various countries. The fourth chapter
presents general background about latest financial crisis, the situation before it and its
main reasons. The chapter also identifies how crisis can spread among countries through
different integration channels. The fifth chapter gives the description of the data used
for empirical testing and methodology applied. The next chapter reports the results of
empirical tests. Finally, the last chapter summarizes the study, the results of empirical
tests and makes conclusions and suggestions for further research.
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1.4.  Literature review
Banks as financial intermediaries and leading financers of economy are always under
the focus of various scholars, economists and politicians. Therefore, large amount of
research is done in different aspects of banks’ activities. Thus, the topic has never lost
its importance and the recent global financial crisis has increased its prominence. The
purpose of this chapter is to explain previous main studies on the bank capital structure,
profitability and risk taking attitudes. It refers to main previous studies in order to draw
a general image of bank capital structure and build a ground for further explanations.
These studies vary from more fundamental ones to very recent research on the banks’
capital structure during latest financial crisis.
1.3.1. Studies on profitability and risk taking attitudes
Previous research to study banks’ behavior were done in order to examine specifically
bank risk taking attitudes, bank profitability dynamics before and at the years of crisis,
CEO compensations, and corporate governance issues prior to and during the crisis. In
their paper “Risk-taking behavior and management ownership in depository
institutions” Chen, Steiner and Whyte (1998) investigate the relationship between
managerial ownership and banks’ risk taking attitude. Their main findings show that as
the proportion of the shares owned by the bank managers increase their risk taking
attitude decrease. This finding has a practical interpretation in order to explain how
managers with different remuneration options have acted in order to avoid much risk.
This might explain why various banks have performed differently during recent
financial crisis. Intuitively, it can be concluded that banks with high proportion of
managerial ownership took less risks compared to those with low managerial
ownership. Managers who hold the shares of their banks more worried about the risk
taking because high proportion of their income comes from the shares.
A study by Hannan and Prager (2009) shows that sometimes some banks might affect
profitability of other banks. Hence, they find out that existence of large banks along
with  rural  community  banks  affect  those  small  banks’  profitability  significantly.  The
study also shows that large out-of-market banks decrease positive effect of
concentration for small community banks. Although the authors explain their findings to
be useful for merger and acquisition decisions it can also be concluded that large banks
drive the whole market and small community banks can be affected severely in case of
failure of large banks.
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Fortin, Goldberg and Roth (2010) investigate the risk taking attitudes of the bank
managers in the period preceding the recent financial crisis. They investigate how
ownership, managerial compensation and risk governance affect risk taking attitudes
after  the  crisis.  Their  results  show  that  CEOs  with  more  control  and  CEOs  who  earn
more in base salary than in bonuses are likely to take less risks. In contrast, CEOs and
managers whose salaries are mostly based on bonuses are willing to take more risks.
They suggest that decision making should be delivered mainly to managers, which in
turn will reduce risk taking attitudes. (Fortin et al. 2010:911)
Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) investigate the impact of Basel II framework on small
and large banks’ risk taking attitude and find out that the framework provides different
opportunities for those banks. Due to high costs of implementations only large banks
can apply internal ratings based (IRB) approach for capital requirements whereas small
banks can only afford to use standardized approach. They argue that adopting IRB lets
large banks to benefit from relatively lower capital requirements and offer low cost
bank services compared to small banks. Therefore, small banks take more risks than
large ones under Basel II accords.
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) investigate the determinants of bank profitability in
Switzerland before and during financial crisis. They find out that the crisis had impact
on banks’ profitability in Switzerland. They conclude that the main factors that explain
bank’s profitability are operational efficiency, the growth of total loans, funding costs
and the business model. The banks which are more efficient than others are more
profitable. “An above average loan volume growth affects bank profitability positively;
higher funding costs result in a lower profitability.” (Dietrich and Wanzenried,
2011:324) Furthermore, they state that banks which are more dependent on interest
incomes are less profitable than others.
On the study of bank profitability during economic downturns Bolt, de Haan,
Hoeberichts, Oordt and Swank (2012) try to explain driving factors of bank
profitability. They find out that, banks’ profitability is affected not only by the current
condition of an economy but also their previous lending history. Hence, long-term
interest rates before economic downturns affect profitability, measured by net interest
income, during crises. Moreover, they find out that loan loss provisions are major
moving  factor  of  banks’  profitability  in  all  phases  of  economic  cycles.  Finally,  their
findings show that 1% decrease in real GDP growth leads to 15% decrease in return on
assets.
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In their study for the impact of good governance in banks on their performance Peni and
Vähämaa (2012) find out that basically banks with good corporate governance
performed better during the crisis. Although, their results are different and do not show
a specific pattern in sake of good governance, general conclusion can be made that good
governance caused significantly higher returns during the financial crisis.
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) examined the reason why some banks perform better during
the financial crisis. They state that banks from the countries with more strict regulations
performed better because they only focused their loans on specific areas. Therefore,
they were not affected by the industries that crisis shocked more. Moreover, their results
show that banks with short-term funding are affected more from the crisis. And banks
with less leverage ratios performed better during the crisis. Furthermore, their results
contradict to the view that poor governance caused the recent financial crisis. In contrast
to the results of Peni and Vähämaa (2010) they find out that, banks with good
governance, which they call banks with share-friendly boards, performed worse than
others.
A study by Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt and Zhu (2013) on how deposit insurance affects
bank risk during crises is interesting in terms of regulatory power of deposit insurance.
Their findings show that deposit insurance increases banks’ risk taking attitude in
general. On the other hand it decreases risk during crises by assuring the minimum
amount to be covered. Moreover, the findings show that countries with deposit
insurance have lower systemic risk compared to the ones without the insurance. Despite
this double characteristic of deposit insurance the authors conclude that it has a negative
impact on bank risk. These findings is consistent with the findings of Forssbæck (2011)
where he finds weak interdependence between deposit insurance and bank risk, because
he assumes a partial deposit insurance in the model. However, the author suggests that
the evidence could be stronger if implicit insurance have been applied.
1.3.2. Studies on bank capital structure
Tremendous amount of research were done for investigating the capital structure of
firms and also specifically banks. Banks’ capital structure differs from traditional firms’
capital structure because of their nature. They are financial institutions and they must
have certain minimum amount of capital according to legislations. This characteristic of
banks sets them aside from other traditional firms.
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More fundamental study by Marcus (1983) is focused on the capital decision of banks.
The author states that the capital ratios of US banks have fallen dramatically in between
the years of 1961 and 1978 and explains this tendency by empirical tests. The author
suggests that this dramatic fall is the result of rising interest rates. Therefore, it can be
concluded that during economic growth the interest rates are also tend to grow, which
leads to the reduction in capital ratios. The author suggests that regulators should be
aware of this tendency and make adjustments to deposit regulations. The study suggests
the regulators have to be more sensitive to changing economic conditions in order to
affect capital ratios effectively.
Another interesting research on bank capital topic by Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995)
suggests that regulation in banking sector has decreased banks’ capital ratios through
many years, and these ratios became the lowest compared to other non-financial
institutions. Berger et al. (1995) discuss the problems related to the regulatory capital
requirements, where they state that it is hard to define regulatory capital, therefore
sometimes regulations are unable to cover all of it and be absolutely efficient.
Inaccurate capital requirements may increase the prices of bank services and cause
opposite effect by decreasing the efficiency of banks. This article is important in order
to understand how the regulations in banking sector might affect banks in different
ways.
Froot and Stein (1998) investigate the relationship among risk management, capital
budgeting and capital structure in banks. Their study relies on the approach which
assumes that banks with the priority to maximize their values are more concerned about
risk management and not all the risks that they are concerned about can be overcome by
hedging operations. From the point of view of capital budgeting and capital structure
choice their findings suggest that in short run raising new capital from external sources
is  costly.  Holding  a  buffer  stock  of  equity  capital  is  also  expensive  for  banks,  even  if
this buffer is financed by retained earnings.
By taking into account these assumptions Froot and Stein (1998) suggest the
followings:
· Banks should hedge the risks which could be skipped out under the conditions of
perfect competition in the market
· Banks  should  hold  certain  amount  of  capital  in  order  to  cover  the  risks  which
cannot be skipped out under the conditions of perfect competition in the market
· Banks  should  value  the  risks  with  less  liquidity  with  a  risk  aversion  as  a
decreasing function of the proportion of capital kept.
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According to Diamond and Rajan (2000) bank’s capital structure choice influences not
only its stability but also its liquidity-creation and credit-creation functions. “The
consequent trade-offs imply an optimal bank capital structure. Because customers rely
to different extents on liquidity and credit, bank capital structure also determines the
nature of the bank’s clientele.” (Diamond and Rajan 2000:2431)
Calomiris and Wilson (2004) investigated how banks manage asset risk and capital
structure under normal economic conditions and during crisis times for New York banks
in  the  years  of  1920s  and  1930s.  They  choose  New  York  City  banks  for  their
investigation mainly because those banks attract economic conditions prior to and
during the Great Depression. According to their results banks were investing more on
risky assets before the Great Depression. Moreover, it was less costly to raise capital
before crisis and maintain the less default risk of deposits. Further results of their study
show that during the time of Great Depression depositors were more worried about their
deposits and pressured the banks to invest in less risky assets. Moreover, banks were
forced to cut the dividends in order to raise the capital for decreasing default risk on
deposits. This capital raising process was more costly, but on the other hand it provided
assurance for the depositors. Capital structure and risk taking behavior in assets return
to normal few years after the crisis.
A study by Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) is interesting in the sense that it explains
how different risk offsetting instruments might affect bank capital structure. They
mainly investigate how loan sales influence capital structure, lending, profit and risk.
The findings show that banks, especially those that are affiliated with large BHCs,
which  sell  loans  in  order  to  reduce  their  risks,  hold  less  capital  than  others.  Their
findings is consistent with previous studies about large BHCs’ capital structure which
indicate that large BHCs hold less capital than other banks. The authors suggest that low
capital do not lead to higher risk ultimately, since they are offset by the sales of loans.
These operations in fact lead to higher profits by banks which is the ultimate goal of
these activities.
According  to  Peura  and  Keppo  (2006)  a  bank  specialist  considers  bank  capital  as  a
shield or guarantee to overcome future asset risks. Bank capital has to be managed in a
proper way which will let a bank to meet its minimum capital requirements even during
harsh economic periods. Obviously, not obeying to minimum capital requirements will
create extra problems with financing under bad economic conditions. Thus, banks will
spend more money to manage their portfolio and it will be difficult to recapitalize its
assets. They investigate bank capital from the point of view of bank’s manager. The
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findings show that delay in recapitalization increases the liquidation risk and the value
of recapitalization option increases due to capital raising and dividend policy.
Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee and Öztekin (2008) investigate the capital ratios of
large US Bank Holding Companies for years 1992-2006. They mainly investigate how
large BHCs in United States determine their capital ratios. Common arguments for
holding  a  bank  capital  is  that,  financing  capital  is  costly,  therefore  banks  tend  to
decrease their capital while they grow. However, the findings by Berger et al. (2008)
show that most of the US BHCs are tend to hold more capital than required by
legislation.  Berger  et  al.  (2008)  explain  this  tendency  with  BHCs’  willingness  to  be
prepared for economic recessions. With this behavior large BHCs also give assurance
for their customers for “bad days” and in case of default. The study lacks the
information how these BHCs act during crisis time, but it is mainly important in terms
of explaining their behavior under normal economic conditions.
Brewer, Kaufman and Wall (2008) study the reason why capital ratios of banks vary in
different countries. Since, Basel principles set same requirements for all banks the
capital ratios are supposed to show similar patterns in all countries. However, the study
by  Brewer  et  al.  (2008)  shows  that  they  are  different.  The  results  show  that  Basel
requirements cannot explain the variation of capital ratios of banks in different
countries. These different patterns are mainly explained by bank specific factors. Banks
tend to hold more capital in the countries with smaller banking industry, more strict
capital regulation and more effective corporate governance. The results also show that
Basel regulations are not applied identically in all countries. Therefore, its regulatory
role is not implemented homogeneously in all countries.
Fonseca and González (2010) study bank capital buffer determinants across various
countries. Firstly, they find out that banks hold more capital if the cost of deposits is
higher and their market power is stronger. The authors suggest that this finding leads to
conclude about the market’s control of itself and it leads to high incentive to hold more
capital buffer. Hence, banks voluntarily hold additional capital buffers if market
discipline  is  working  well.  On  the  other  hand,  banks  are  less  willing  to  hold  more
capital buffers when the government intervention and supervision is strong. The authors
conclude that strong supervision reduces market’s power to control itself and leads to
imbalances in banks’ capital buffers.
In their study of the impact of bank capital on performance Berger and Bowman (2013)
investigate how capital affects the performance of small, medium and large banks
during different economic cycles. Their findings show that capital is very helpful for
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small banks not only during banking and market crisis and also during normal times. It
increases the opportunity to prevent economic shocks in all types of crises, either
banking or market. Furthermore, capital buffers help medium and large banks basically
during banking crises, especially when government intervention is minor. The findings
are important to assert the importance of bank capital buffers and its impact on different
sized banks.
1.5. Main hypotheses
Relying to these previous studies this thesis investigates the patterns of capital ratios
and funding structure of banks before, during and after financial crisis of 2007-2009. It
is expected that the crisis has changed the capital structure of banks. Therefore, the
following hypothesis is proposed in order to test this:
H1: The recent global financial crisis has generally affected the capital structure of
banks.
Furthermore, it is expected that the crisis has also changed the structure of short-term
and long-term liabilities and the following hypothesis suggested in order to test it:
H2: The recent global financial crisis has changed the structure of short-term and long-
term liabilities of banks.
Moreover, in order to test whether the Scandinavian countries were ready for this kind
of crises because of their past experience the following hypothesis is proposed:
H3: Scandinavian countries, particularly Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, are
less affected by the recent global financial crisis than other European countries.
Finally, in order to test which countries were affected by the crisis initially and which
ones in later stages it is hypothesized that:
H4: The recent global financial crisis affected initially the countries which are more
integrated with US economy.
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2. CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES
Ideally capital structure refers to the distribution of resources on the right hand side of a
company’s balance sheet. It identifies how firms support the left hand side of balance
sheet, i.e. assets, by debt and equity. Generally, we are more concerned about debt, i.e.
liabilities, because they are more flexible compared to equity. Especially, in the case of
banks, equity is more stable compared to other non-financial institutions because of
clearly defined regulations. In larger corporations the structure of debt can be complex
because of different claimants and the nature of debts, which makes capital structure
management more complicated.
Although early theories of capital structure suggest that firms’ market values are not
affected by their capital structures, later developments had proved their opposite. Now
theories agree in one point that the choice of capital affects firm’s market value and also
risk. In his article in the Wall Street Journal, Milken (2009) states that optimal capital
structure develops gradually. Decision makers should consider six factors in the process
of formation of optimal capital structure: “the company and its management, industry
dynamics, the state of capital markets, the economy, government regulation and social
trends.” (Milken 2009)
Obviously first theories of capital structure ignore these factors and evaluate firm’s
capital structure in the terms of perfect market. Further developments show that the
factors like bankruptcy costs, taxes, agency costs, and information asymmetry affect
firm’s value. Having more debt will increase the value of a firm and its riskiness as
well. Of course it cannot increase the value of a firm endlessly, therefore the optimal
capital structure matters.
Optimal capital structure is explained by various theories of capital structure. It is worth
to mention especially, Modigliani Miller theory, Trade-off and Pecking order theories of
capital structure. Modigliani and Miller developed first structured capital structure
theory and raised interest in this topic. Further theories were aimed to develop MM’s
theory and draw different tracks in this field of finance. The purpose of this chapter is to
explain the main points of these theories briefly and discuss them from banks’
perspectives.
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2.1.  Modigliani & Miller theorem
Traditionally it is believed that there is an optimal ratio of debt and equity when the cost
of  debt  (RD)  is  the  lowest  and  cost  of  equity  (RE) is the highest, and adding up more
debt increases firm’s value until certain point. At this point the Weighted Average Cost
of Capital (WACC, RA) is in its best position and debt-to-equity ratio is in its optimum.
Traditionalists believe that WACC decreases until this optimal ratio and increases
thereafter. Brealy and Myers (2003) suggest that the traditional approach could be
justified by two arguments. Firstly, investors do not acknowledge the risk formed by
additional borrowings but they notice it when they are overlevered. Secondly,
inefficiency of the markets allows the borrowing firms to offer beneficial assistance for
investors. Therefore, the value of firm’s shares should increase by adding up the
premium for non-efficient markets. Graphically traditional approach can be described as
in the Figure 2.
Figure 2. Traditional approach to capital structure. (Brealey & Myers 2003:479).
In contrast to the traditional view of capital structure Modigliani and Miller (1958)
claim that firm’s value is not affected by its capital structure. Modigliani and Miller’s
(1958) paper is considered as the first systematic and profound research in capital
structure. Marco Modigliani and Merton Howard Miller’s paper “The cost of capital,
corporation finance and the theory of investment”, first published in The American
Economic Review was the starting point for the subsequent capital structure theories.
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However, according to Rubinstein (2003) the first attempt to explain capital structure’s
importance was made by John Burr Williams (1938). Williams (1938) makes close
equivalent of Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I, but his research relies on intuitive
results rather than solid proofs, as Modigliani and Miller (1958) claim in their paper.
Proposition I of Modigliani and Miller (1958:268) argue that “the market value of any
firm is independent of its capital structure” and obtained by discounting its expected
return at certain rate proper to its class. Mathematically Proposition I is expressed with
the following formula:
(1) V୨ = ൫ ௝ܵ + 	ܦ௝൯ = ௝ܺ ߩ௞൘
Where,
Vj-value of a firm,
Sj-market value of the firm’s common shares,
Dj-market value of the firm’s debt,
X̅j-expected profit before taxes,
ρk-average cost of capital.
This formula also indicates that the average cost of capital is independent from the
structure of capital and calculated as the ratio of average returns and the value of a firm.
Proposition II states that, the average cost of capital is helpful for calculating the
expected rate of return of the companies with some debt in capital structure. Thus, the
expected rate of return is equal to the sum of average cost of capital and premium
related to financial  risk.  Finally,  Proposition III  argues that the investment decision of
any company is independent from the type of security it is being financed by. Thus, a
company will carry out the investment decision if the expected rate of return is equal or
larger than the average cost of capital. Figure 3 shows the movement of cost of equity
(RE),  cost  of  debt  (RD)  and  average  cost  of  capital  (RA) as the debt-to-equity ratio
increases under Modigliani and Miller propositions.
The expected return on equity (RE) increases significantly until the debt becomes
riskier.  The  expected  return  grows slowly  after  that  point  and  as  debt  becomes  riskier
investors demand more return on debt thereafter. However, these developments do not
affect average cost of capital, and firm’s value as MM’s Propositions suggest.
Modigliani and Miller make corrections to their model by adding taxes to propositions
in 1963. New model (Modigliani & Miller 1963) suggests that by increasing debt a firm
will reduce average cost of capital substantially. Subsequently, the firm can achieve the
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highest market value by fully debt financing. However, they argue that although this can
be correct mathematically, practically sometimes financing by own capital can be
cheaper (retained earnings) than financing by outside sources (debt). Also investors are
obliged to pay taxes on their wealth, which will somehow be attributed on debt.
Figure 3. Modigliani-Miller approach to capital structure (Brealey & Myers 2003:474).
Hirshleifer (1966) discusses MM’s Proposition I by adding corporate income tax and
income tax separately. He argues that holding other things equal, adding income tax will
increase the value of equity compared to the value of debt and assets. On the other hand,
adding corporate income tax to the Proposition I will let the firms to increase the firms’
value by increasing the proportion of debt in their total capital. These suggestions are
also identical with Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) corrections. Further, Stiglitz (1969)
introduces the possibility of bankruptcy to MM’s propositions and discusses that, the
more a firm issues debt the more it pays interests on it. Moreover, in the case of
bankruptcy expected returns will not be the same for all firms and therefore, the value of
firms will not be the same as well.
Miller  (1977)  discusses  bankruptcy  costs  in  his  paper  as  the  correction  to  initial  MM
Propositions, however he states that bankruptcy costs and agency costs are trivial
compared to the costs related to corporate and income taxes. The newly modified model
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includes corporate taxes, personal income tax for common stocks and personal income
taxes for bonds. According to new model tax rates affect gains from leverage
significantly,  and  even  high  tax  rates  can  turn  the  gain  to  negative.  Therefore,  new
model defines new capital structure choice dependent on tax rates, while the old model
ignores  them.  If  the  tax  rate  for  common  stock  is  lower  than  the  tax  rate  for  holding
bonds, then investors will invest more on common stock, and it will be difficult for a
firm to borrow, therefore gain from leverage will be lower. The implication of these
taxes proves that, they affect capital structure and the value of a firm.
Although Modigliani and Miller theory do not explain capital structure choice for actual
market, it was useful in developing further theories of capital structure. MM
propositions take into consideration only bankruptcy costs and tax rates in further
developments. However, these are not the only factors that affect capital structure
choice of firms. Therefore, the model lacks profound explanation of how optimal capital
structure should be. Subsequent theories of capital structure try to explain it from
different aspects.
2.2.  Trade-off theory of capital structure
The trade-off theory is the sum of  theories  by  different  authors,  where  they  try  to
explain capital structure by the gains and expenses of various leverage strategies. It is
believed that optimal capital structure is achieved when marginal gains and marginal
expenses are in equilibrium. Initially the trade-off theory was stimulated by the
discussions around Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) theory after adding corporate income
taxes. MM’s corrections discusses capital structure only by tax perspective and suggest
that optimal capital structure can be achieved by fully debt financing. However, this was
impossible under real conditions; therefore neutralizing costs for debt financing were
required in order to improve the model. (Frank and Goyal 2007)
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) show different way of calculating the optimal capital
structure by introducing the financial distress costs to Modigliani Miller model (1963).
They state that optimal capital structure can be achieved by haggling between the tax
gains and the costs for financial distress. The market value of a firm with debt in capital
structure is equal to the sum of unlevered market value of the firm and corporate tax rate
times the market value of firm’s debt, less (1-tax rate) times the present value of the
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costs for financial distress. (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973:918) Graphically it can be
shown as in the Figure 4.
Figure 4. Optimal capital structure according to trade-off theory (Brealey and Myers
2003).
While discussing the static trade-off hypothesis, Myers (1984:577) states that firms
always look for optimal capital structure by “substituting debt for equity and equity for
debt” until they find the optimum. In order to achieve this optimum firms also make
some spending which leads them to optimal capital structure after some period of time.
Myers  (1984)  suggests  that  firms  with  high  variance  of  the  value  of  assets  should
borrow less, since they are considered as relatively riskier. Moreover, firms with more
tangible assets are willing to borrow less than those holding intangible assets, because
they can easily exchange their assets to cash. These behaviors explain different capital
structures of firms with the same market value.
Frank and Goyal (2007:7) suggest that static and dynamic trade-off theory must be
distinguished due to the differences occurring from tax code, bankruptcy cost and
transaction costs. They define static and dynamic trade-off theories as follows:
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“Definition 1. A firm is said to follow the static trade-off theory if the firm’s leverage is
determined by a single period trade-off between tax benefits of debt and the deadweight
costs of bankruptcy.
Definition 2. A firm is said to exhibit target adjustment behavior if the firm has a target
level of leverage and if deviations from that target are gradually removed over time.”
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) explain how firms’ capital structures should be under
static trade-off hypothesis. In order to build their model they make the following
assumptions:
· Investors are risk neutral and they are taxed in a progressive way, however firms
are taxed in a constant rate;
· Taxes are based on end-of-period conditions and debts are deductable from
taxable amount;
· Along  with  standard  tax  shield  there  are  also  non-debt  tax  shields  which  cuts
firm’s tax liability;
· Firms  will  accumulate  costs  for  financial  distress  in  case  they  fail  to  meet  the
demands of the creditors.
The study is based on cross-sectional analysis of the capital structure of firms from
different industries. The results show that as the costs for financial distress and non-debt
tax shield increase the optimal leverage decreases, i.e. there is an inverse relationship
between  them.  Also  the  volatility  of  earnings  and  R&D  and  marketing  expenses  are
inversely related with leverage. Moreover, the findings show strong relation between
the leverage and non-debt tax shield, which they call “puzzling” because it disagrees
with  previous  theory.  They  try  to  explain  this  with  the  securability  of  non-debt  tax
shield and with the shortcomings of the cross-sectional analysis. As the authors state,
despite few limitations the model itself is interesting in explaining different variations of
capital structure of firms from various industries.
Static trade-off theory is unable to explain the factors that affect capital structure over
the time. Therefore, dynamic model of trade-off hypothesis was introduced in order to
explain missing effects of static model. Capital structure of firms may differ from year
to year by their performance, goals and changing conditions. A firm might want to pay
dividends for good performance in the end of period, or might want to raise funds in
order to make new investments. These affect the structure of capital in the subsequent
periods, which can be explained by dynamic trade-off model.
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Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) discuss the dynamic trade-off with the existence of
recapitalization costs (transaction costs and agency costs) along with tax and bankruptcy
trade-off. Capital structure is fluctuating because of the presence of recapitalization
costs.  Firms  set  upper  and  lower  limits  for  their  debt-to  equity  ratio  and  try  to  stay
between those lines. When firms earn more they pay back debts, when they reach lower
line of debt then they borrow more. Hence, they try to fluctuate within the limits that are
set beforehand. Smaller and riskier firms and firms with lower-tax and lower-
bankruptcy costs have more fluctuating capital structure. (Fischer et al. 1989:39) The
results  show  that  trivial  amount  of  recapitalization  costs  are  able  to  slow  down  the
process of adjustment to the optimum.
All the developments in the trade-off theory make it better than classic Modigliani and
Miller Propositions. Although MM’s Propositions are improved by adding tax gain, it
still ignores transaction and bankruptcy costs as important determinants of capital
structure. Different advocates of trade-off theory expand the research by adding these
factors  to  MM’s  Propositions  to  build  their  new  model.  New  model  explains  the
deviations of capital structure around firms better and defines the importance of
bankruptcy costs, transaction costs and agency costs in the process of forming optimal
capital structure. Similar to MM’s Propositions, trade-off theory cannot explain capital
structure choice completely. Therefore, different approach to the capital structure was
introduced and developed by various scholars. The next section discusses the main
points of pecking order theory of capital structure and its development through time.
2.3.  Pecking order theory of capital structure
Classical approach by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and trade-off theory of capital
structure rely on market efficiency and equal distribution of information along market
participants. However, in practice it is not true and information cannot be reached
equally by all market participants. This can be observed thorough the reaction of stock
prices to newly released information by firms. The information about a company’s
dividend payments or the increase in payable dividends can raise its share prices. On the
other hand the information about the issuance of new equity can decrease share prices as
the investors will be worried about the reliability of the previous price of shares. These
movements of stock prices let us make conclusion about asymmetric accessibility of
information in markets.
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Obviously managers of a certain firm know more than the outsiders, i.e. potential
investors, about the firm. Asymmetric accessibility nature of information lets the
managers to choose from different sources of financing. Usually managers have
different sources of financing like internal funds, debt issuance option and equity
issuance option. However, these sources of financing do not have the same “price”; one
source offers cheaper money than another. Asymmetric accessibility of information
about a firm lets managers to speculate and choose the cheapest source of financing.
Thus managers can decide to issue debt or new equity to collect  money from external
sources. Issuing equity may lead investors to think about the overvalued stock of the
company and make difficult to collect target funds. Therefore, issuance of new stock
may turn a costly process. On the other hand, a firm can issue a debt in order to collect
cash from external sources. Market will consider this news as growing opportunity for
the firm and it will not negatively affect the company’s share prices. By knowing this
behavior of markets managers will always choose debt for financing if they can choose.
Certainly internally generated cash is the cheapest financing source for any company.
Therefore, firms will prefer internal financing if they can choose from all three sources
of financing, i.e. internally generated cash, debt and equity. This order of preference of
financing is explained by the pecking order theory of capital structure. Figure 5
describes the order of choice for firm’s financing under pecking order theory.
Figure 5. Preference of financing under pecking order hypothesis.
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Myers and Majluf (1984) discuss mainly firms’ preference of external financing in the
existence of asymmetric access to information. They claim that managers would prefer
issuing debt to equity in order to raise cash for new investments. Managers’ goal is to
preserve and increase the wealth of shareholders. Therefore, they are less willing to
issue new equity and lower the wealth of shareholders. Moreover, shareholders are less
likely to support the plans that lower their wealth. As a result managers will prefer debt
to equity as external source of financing. As Myers and Majluf (1984) state, firms
should prefer less risky financing; hence they would better issue bonds and raise their
equity with retained earnings. They also state that in case of lack of financing and
issuance of less risky debt firms should give up investment decisions by acting in the
interests of shareholders. Moreover, firms should not pay dividends if they lack cash in
order to finance investments. Although dividend announcements could be a good signal
about firm’s good performance, it may lead to difficulties in future financing by
affecting capital structure. One of the main conclusions by Myers and Majluf (1984) is
that equity financing will lower the stock price of firm, while debt financing will not.
Therefore, they claim that firms should always prefer debt financing to equity, other
things equal.
While discussing the existence of asymmetric information Myers (1984) suggests that
firms should “issue debt when investors undervalue the firm, and equity or some other
risky security, when they overvalue it.” This can be a good starting point for investors,
which is also applied in practice. Myers (1984:581) states that firms will follow pecking
order hypothesis mainly because of the following reasons:
· They choose internal funds,
· They adapt their dividend payout ratios to their investment opportunities, in
order to avoid sudden changes in dividends,
· Unchanged dividend policies, erratic changes in profitability and investment
opportunities leads to the deficit and surplus of internally generated cash from
time to time. If there is a surplus the firm pays back its debts and makes
investments to marketable securities, otherwise it collects cash by selling
marketable securities,
· When firms have to rely on external funds they should consider the sources from
less risky to most risky ones. Thus, firms should follow debt → hybrid securities
→ equity sequence as a source of financing.
These four factors explain how firms act under pecking order hypothesis in order to
formulate their capital structure. Although there is not clearly defined target leverage
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ratio in pecking order theory, it explains the differences in capital structures of the firms
with the same size and profitability indicators. It explains why firms with different
profitability indicators have different attitudes towards leverage. As Modigliani and
Miller (1958) suggest, firms can maximize their value by increasing their leverage.
However, pecking order theory explains that firms are not always willing to increase
their debt if they have enough internal funds. As Brealey and Myers (2003:514) suggest
pecking order theory is not able to explain the differences of capital structures of the
firms in different industries. Leverage ratios are apparently low in high-tech and fast
growing industries when there is a need for external financing. Moreover, it cannot
explain the behavior of utility companies of not paying back debts with the surplus of
cash.  Generally,  all  the  theories  of  capital  structure  explain  some  points  of  the
differences in leverage ratios across industries and firms. All in all they give a profound
background for different behaviors in capital structure choice.
2.4.  Capital structure choice from bank perspective
Banks as financial institutions differ from other firms of economy. Being financial
intermediaries, banks borrow from surplus funds in order to finance deficit in economy.
Obviously dependent on the nature of their operations banks have more debt on their
capital than any other firm in economy. Therefore standard capital structure theories do
not completely hold for banks and they have to be interpreted differently from banks’
perspective.
First of all, there are clearly defined game rules in banking sector of all countries. Most
of the large economies of the world apply common rules in their banking system
defined by Basel Committee on Bank Supervision. Basel Accords on banking defined
by this committee is forming the general structure of capital in those countries, hence
the capital structure choice of banks show close similarities in these countries. Although
the rules defined by this committee are not applied in all countries, generally banks are
managed by the central banking system in all countries. Therefore, the existence of
regulation leads to homogeneities in capital structure in all countries.
Intuitively it can be claimed that banks are more levered than non-financial institutions
because the nature of their operations require borrowing in order to make money. This
intuitive claim can be observed from Gropp and Heider (2009) and Frank and Goyal’s
(2007) papers. Their samples of US and EU banks and US non-financial non-farm firms
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show that mean book leverage ratios of these institutions in 2003-2004 years were 93%
and 32% respectively. However the leverage ratio of banks was not such extreme in mid
1800s. A study by Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995) shows that aggregate leverage
ratios have increased from about 50% in 1840 to its utmost position nowadays. Today’s
numbers indicate that in general banks have almost ideal capital structure from the point
of view of Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) approach, since they have achieved
maximum debt in their capital structure. On the other hand they cannot achieve 100%
debt in their capital structure because of the capital and liquidity regulations by
authorities.  Banks  try  to  increase  their  values  by  employing  higher  debt,  mainly
deposits, in their capital, but they are also worried about the costs for financial distress
as  trade-off  theory  suggests.  Shareholders  equity  should  also  behaved  as  the  cost  for
financial distress, since it plays a role as a guarantee for customers’ assurance and
loyalty. Supposedly banks’ capital structure choice relies mainly on Modigliani and
Miller’s (1958) propositions and trade-off theory.
While discussing optimal bank capital structure Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that
capital (equity) is important for banks in order to cover credit losses in bad economic
conditions during bank runs. Banks have to negotiate with depositors during bank runs,
which is costly, time demanding and mostly impossible process (because of high
number of depositors). Bank capital is employed in this case in order to overcome these
hardships with fewer losses. Apparently holding equity is important for all counterparts
of bank transactions. Diamond and Rajan (2000) state three effects of bank capital
(equity) which define its role in bank’s capital structure: more capital increases the
“guarantee” for crises; it increases the opportunity to attract new deposits and affects the
amount that is paid back by borrowers.
Marcus (1983) argues that optimal capital structure for banks is achieved through
trading-off between marginal benefits and marginal costs. He also states that Modigliani
and Miller’s (1958) propositions do not hold for banks because in practice there are
capital and deposit regulations and other costs for financial distress which affect banks’
capital structure and their market value. US tax system allows banks (not only banks) to
increase their leverage in order to increase their market values. Since the main
proportion of debt in bank’s capital structure constitutes deposits, there are associated
insurance costs with them. Banks can increase their leverage by increasing insurance
payments to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which seems to be a costly
process. Fund raising through deposits is offset by mainly rising riskiness of the bank
and bankruptcy probability. Furthermore, centralized regulation requires auditing costs
and may lead the suspension of FDIC membership in the case of not meeting the
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requirements. Therefore, Marcus (1983:1219) suggests that by overcoming the
regulatory obstacles bank “maximizes its value by increasing equity to the point at
which the marginal value of reduced regulatory pressure and potential bankruptcy costs
equals the marginal tax disadvantage of equity finance.” Marcus (1983) concludes that
in order to maintain more effective regulation central governments should take into
account changing economic conditions while setting new capital adequacy ratios and
insurance rates for deposits. Mainly Marcus’s (1983) approach to optimal bank capital
structure is explained by trade-off theory.
According to Flannery and Rangan (2004) while non-financial institutions try to adapt
their capital structure to changing market conditions, banks must take into consideration
also regulations by central authorities. This characteristic makes for a banker to predict
optimal capital structure more difficult. They also state that capital structure choice is
affected by the size of a bank as well. Large banking companies are more likely to meet
the capital adequacy and liquidity requirements through more diversified operations,
which let them to reduce riskiness. Therefore they can increase leverage more easily
compared to small banks. Hence, capital and liquidity regulations might not affect large
banks much and their capital structure choice can be similar to non-financial firms with
the limitation of equity.
Berlin (2011) argues that banks set explicit capital targets and try to achieve it through
time. This is what says dynamic trade-off theory, therefore it can be stated that banks
mostly  follow  dynamic  trade-off  model  of  capital  structure.  This  can  be  justified  by
observing banks’ behaviors by taking into account several subsequent years. Previous
studies also show that banks try to adapt changing economic and regulatory conditions.
By having more factors affecting their attitudes, banks apparently have more precise
target capital than non-financial firms.
The study by Peura and Keppo (2006) also tries to explain banks’ capital structure
choice from the point of view of dynamic trade-off theory. They argue that, capital
structure choice for banks, first of all, is a risk controlling behavior and banks consider
capital as a shield for future financial distresses. Peura and Keppo (2006) firmly claim
that bank’s capital structure choice is the choice which is dominated by regulations
under minimum capital systems. However, previous studies show that minimum capital
is not a case if the size of a bank is large. Economic conditions also affect bank’s capital
structure as Flannery and Rangan (2004) state. Therefore, this extreme statement by
Peura and Keppo (2006) cannot be applied to all banks but small sized.
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Apparently, most of the approaches to bank capital structure are trying to explain it by
trade-off theory. Since, banks have precisely defined capital adequacy ratios set by
regulators they are trying to find optimal debt to equity choice by bargaining between
the factors affecting these two. As debt is mainly formed by deposits banks are trying to
increase their deposit customers. On the other hand deposit insurance regulations do not
let them use all amount of attracted funding by applying minimum reserve
requirements. Moreover, debt itself is offset by capital (equity) regulations. Hence,
optimal capital structure of a bank is achieved by adjusting debt and equity to the game
rules set by regulators and changing economic conditions.
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3. BANK CAPITAL, FUNDING STRUCTURE AND REGULATIONS
This chapter identifies main issues on the bank capital and its supervision. Firstly, the
importance and necessity for holding capital for banks are explained and their
calculation methods described. Further funding structure of banks is discussed briefly.
The  third  section  of  this  chapter  clarifies  origins  of  bank  regulations  and  its
development through history. This section also illustrates evolution of Basel bank
regulation principles and the need for the new changes. Finally, the different bank
regulation and macroeconomic regulation approaches are explained for various
countries.
3.1.  Why bank capital is important?
As it was discussed in the previous chapter, firms (also financial firms) would like to
maximize their profits by increasing their debt until they reach the 100% debt financing.
However this is impossible in reality, therefore they are willing to keep debt as high as
they can. In banking industry this attitude is offset by clearly defined capital regulatory
rules. Since banks are more entwined with whole economy they are more sensitive to
changing economic conditions. Although countries which stick to classical capitalist
approach did not have tight rules for bank regulation, the recent financial crisis made
them to think about their choice again. Hence, as being the main instrument of bank
regulation capital regulation became more important in recent years.
It  is  important  to  mention  that  shareholders  are  more  worried  about  common stock  in
the right hand side of a bank’s balance sheet because their wealth depends on its quality.
Acting as the main source of shareholders’ wealth, capital carries out six important
functions as Rose and Hudgins (2008) state. Firstly, capital acts as the buffer for
financial crises. Holding enough capital required by regulations lets banks to prevent
initial consequences of possible crises. Capital absorbs the first shocks and lets banks
gain enough time to decide the ways to overcome further shocks. Secondly, capital is
necessary in order to establish a bank and earn license for banking operations. It
maintains initial activities such as buying offices, hiring employees, paying
administrative costs in the first stages of banks’ formation.
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The third function of capital, as Rose and Hudgins (2008) state, is public assurance.
Capital provides assurance to general public and also for government that the bank is
strong enough to satisfy all its counterparts, i.e., borrowers, lenders (depositors),
investors, and etc. Higher capital ratios make a bank more reliable for depositors. This
is also important for banks themselves because deposits are the main source of debt in
their capital structure. The assurance role of capital and trust of depositors provide
additional funds for banks and derives capital’s fourth function: growth and
diversification of business tool. High capital lets banks to expand their business and also
shift their activities from classical banking to new innovative banking operations.
Another function of the capital is its growth regulatory role. While banks grow, their
capital decreases compared to their liabilities. Therefore, they have to increase their
capital through several ways. Obviously, raising capital is costly and it is not very easy
for  banks  to  attract  new capital.  Hence,  this  restriction  somehow prevents  banks  from
over growing and maintains sustainable gradual growth. Finally, bank capital acts as the
guarantee for the government in the case of the bank’s failure in order to pay back some
proportion of claims. Hence it has also a macroeconomic importance along with all
above mentioned functions.
Although major concerns of shareholders are about the quality of common stock, it is
not the only component of bank capital. The components of capital can be classified as
follows: (Rose and Hudgins 2008)
Figure 6. Components of bank capital.
Of these components of capital common stock, preferred stock, surplus and retained
earnings belong to Tier 1 capital, the rest consist Tier 2 capital. Also common shares in
Common stock
Preferred stock
Surplus
Retained earnings (Undivided profit)
Reserves
Subordinated debentures
Minority interest in consolidated subsidiaries
Equity commitment notes
Tier 1
Tier 2
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consolidated subsidiaries are included in Tier 1 capital. It is crucial to distinguish
between these two because banks calculate their capital ratios according to this
classification. Common stock or common shares are the shares issued at par value and
giving dividends according to the performance of a bank. Board of directors decides
whether to pay dividends to shareholders or not. On the other hand, preferred stock pays
fixed dividends to its  holders and they are issued with certain maturity.  Surplus is  the
difference between share’s par value and market value when stock price is higher than
par value. Retained or undivided earnings are the earnings that are retained from bank’s
activities and not paid out as dividend. They might be used for future activities, can be
paid out as dividends or be capitalized by issuing new stock. Reserves or loan loss
provisions are the money that is allocated for probable loan losses. Reserves created for
certain purposes, such as paying declared dividends or debt obligations occurring from
past activities, also included in the capital. Subordinated debentures are the claims by
investors which are junior compared to depositors’ claims. Minority interest is the
proportion  of  shares  of  a  consolidated  company  which  is  not  owned  by  the  parent
company. Equity commitment note is  the type of security which lets the holder to sell
certain proportion of common or preferred stock in the future. (Rose and Hudgins 2008,
BCBS 2011)
Basel Accords on bank regulation gives more precise description of these components
of capital. The definitions have been improved through the evolution of Basel
regulatory standards. Hence, ambiguous definitions in early Basel standards had let
banks manipulate while calculating capital ratios which lead inaccurate information
about banks’ safeness. Capital elements composing Tier 1 capital are considered safer
capital which can be reached immediately in case of need. On the other hand, the
elements composing Tier 2 capital are less reliable and it might take longer time to
collect them in order to meet the claims. Banks calculate several capital ratios deriving
from the Basel Accords. Two main capital ratios are Tier 1 capital ratio and Total
capital ratio or Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). Additionally banks calculate Equity Tier
1 capital ratio and Core Tier 1 capital ratio. The formula for calculating Capital
Adequacy Ratio is as follows:
(2) ܥܣܴ = ୘୧ୣ୰	ଵା୘୧ୣ୰	ଶ
ୖ୧ୱ୩	୵ୣ୧୥୦୲ୣୢ	(୭୬	ୠୟ୪ୟ୬ୡୣ	ୱ୦ୣୣ୲	ା	୭୤୤	ୠୟ୪ୟ୬ୡୣ	ୱ୦ୣୣ୲)	ୟୱୱୣ୲ୱ
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Risk weighted assets are calculated according to the defined risk weights by Basel
Accords. In order to calculate risk weighted assets the assets are multiplied with their
corresponding risk ranges. Capital Adequacy Ratio lets to draw general image about a
bank’s  readiness  to  meet  its  liability  claims,  credit  risk,  liquidity  risk  and  other  risks
associated with the bank’s operations. The calculation of Tier 1 capital ratio is similar to
the  calculation  of  CAR.  It  only  excludes  Tier  2  in  order  to  measure  the  adequacy  of
more reliable resources that bank own. Additional capital  ratios such as Equity Tier 1
and Core Tier 1 include some elements of Tier 1. Hence, Equity Tier 1 capital ratio
includes common equity and retained earnings in the numerator. This is the most
reliable capital adequacy ratio because common equity and retained earnings are the
most  stable  funds  for  banks  in  case  of  any  crises  or  shocks.  Core  Tier  1  capital  ratio
includes silent participations along with common equity and retained earnings in the
numerator.  Silent  participants  are  the  investors  holding  certain  amount  of  stock  of  a
bank and sharing profit or loss along with other shareholders. They mainly do not
participate in decision making. However, they can also participate in this process if
approved by both sides beforehand. All these aforementioned capital adequacy
measures calculate different components of capital relevant to the riskiness of assets, i.e.
the capital is compared to risk weighted assets. Banks also calculate Tier 1 leverage
ratio which measures the ratio of Tier 1 capital to bank’s consolidated on-balance sheet
and off-balance sheet assets (non-weighted for risk).
These ratios are important measures in order to identify how ready a bank is to face the
risks  deriving  from  its  activities.  Major  risks  that  banks  can  face  are  Credit  Risk,
Liquidity Risk and Interest Rate Risk. Moreover banks face risks associated with
exchange rates, operations, fraud etc. Credit Risk evolves from a bank’s counterparts’
failure to accomplish responsibilities deriving from the contract. Thus, when borrowers
fail to pay-off their loans, bank in its turn is not able to pay depositors’ interests.
Therefore, capital ratio is altered in this case, which affects the bank’s safeness
ultimately. Liquidity risk measures how fast a bank can satisfy its claimants. It assures
that a bank holds enough cash and cash equivalents in order to meet claims in a
relatively short time. Interest Rate Risk maintains the risk occurring from the average
lending rate and average borrowing rate. Market rates might change due to changing
economic conditions; therefore it is crucial to manage this risk continually. Other risks
such as operational risk, exchange risk and fraud risk can be faced during daily
activities, which are the result of internal-operational and fraud risk, and external,
exchange rate factors. Managing these risks is an integral part of capital regulation.
(Rose and Hudgins 2008)
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Generally, bank capital issues play central role in banking and bank regulation. Wall
(1985) mentions three important functions of capital regulation. Firstly, capital is
needed to be regulated in order to reduce the risk of bank failures. Secondly, it provides
public assurance. And finally, capital regulation reduces the possible losses for a
government deriving from deposit insurance. The third section discusses how these
needs changed capital regulation over history, its current conditions and future
prospects. (Rose and Hudgins 2008)
3.2.  Funding structure of banks
As discussed in the pecking order theory of capital structure firms prefer internally
generated cash flows first when they need additional finances in order to maintain their
activities. By understanding the nature and scale of banking activities one can see that
internally generated cash is not enough to finance banks’ activities. Therefore, banks
mainly rely on external sources of financing and specifically on the debt. Structure of
the liabilities of banks provides very good information about how important the funding
is for banks. The following is the structure of a banks debt (or funds) in balance sheet
according to Rose and Hudgins (2008:138-139):
1) Short-term liabilities
a) Deposits
i) Demand deposits
ii) Time deposits
iii) Money market deposits
b) Non-deposit sources
i) Borrowings from a central bank
ii) Repurchase agreements (repo)
iii) Commercial paper market (e.g. bonds)
iv) Borrowings from international institutions
2) Long-term liabilities
a) Long-term borrowings (savings deposits etc.)
As seen from the structure of liabilities deposits occupy important place in a bank’s
funding. Therefore, banks always trade-off carefully between cost and gains of
collecting deposits while raising funds. Deposits have crucial impact on liquidity risk by
being a short-term funding for long-term assets. Hence, the majority of deposits are
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short-term deposits such as demand deposits, money market deposits, and other non-
interest bearing deposits.
Generally, all banks offer two types of deposits, interest bearing and non-interest
bearing deposits, which form most of their liabilities. Share of non-interest bearing
deposits in banks’ balance sheet has increased significantly in recent years (Rose and
Hudgins 2008:388-389). This happened mainly because of the increase in the number of
checking (current) account customers and new regulations on payments systems. For
instance, in many countries legal entities are required to have a settlement account with
a bank in order to start a business. Moreover, increase of international trade in last 20
years has increased the number of correspondent accounts, current accounts for banks,
and interbank transactions.
Non-interest bearing deposits are usually low-cost source of funding for banks;
however, it is not as stable as interest bearing deposits. While new regulations and
changing economic conditions help to increase non-interest bearing deposit customers
without much effort, banks try to raise funds through more stable deposits. Therefore,
interest bearing deposits require stricter management and are more costly. As the cost of
deposits affect the price of bank loans, managers carefully take into account market
conditions and competitiveness of the offered interest bearing deposits. Moreover, as a
main source of funding, deposit management is the part of liquidity risk management of
banks.
While discussing deposits’ role in liquidity risk management it is important to mention
key ratios related with deposits. These ratios are core deposit ratio, deposit composition
ratio and deposit brokerage index. (Rose and Hudgins 2008:362) Core deposit ratio
measures the ratio of core deposits to total assets. Core deposits are the ones that are
less likely to “leave” the bank in a significantly short period. These mainly include
savings accounts and low amount checking accounts. These deposits are less sensitive
to interest rate changes either because of their longer terms or trivial amounts and non-
interest bearing characteristics. The more is core deposit ratio the less is the probability
of liquidity risk.
Deposit composition ratio measures the share of demand deposits in total time deposits.
Demand  deposits  can  be  withdrawn  at  any  time,  whereas  time  deposits  can  be
withdrawn at the maturity time. Similar to core deposit ratio higher deposit composition
ratio indicates the existence of more stable funds. Therefore, bank managers want to
keep this ratio in the minimum threshold level. These levels might change for different
banks, since it is bank’s choice whether to hold higher proportion of easy access
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demand deposits or rely mostly on more stable funds. Deposit brokerage index
measures the ratio of brokered deposits to total deposits. Brokered deposits are deposits
which are pooled from different deposits and sold to third parties. Banks receive higher
interests for brokered deposits however they are quite unstable and high brokerage
index indicates high liquidity risk. (Rose and Hudgins 2008)
Other sources of funding such as borrowing from central bank, repos, bond market, and
interbank borrowings are also important for fund raising. These sources of funding are
usually  short-term  borrowings  and  are  useful  to  carry  out  the  goals  associated  with
significantly short-period activities. On the other hand, during economic downturns, and
the loss of trust to banks by public these sources become crucial for banks. Therefore,
funding choices and structure of banks vary significantly during different periods of
economic cycle. As a rule during economic crises customers withdraw their deposits
from banks because of future uncertainty and pessimistic expectations. Convincing the
customers to keep their deposits with the banks becomes very costly and in most cases
impossible, and banks search for other less costly funds. Therefore, share of short-term
funds usually increase during economic downturns. These characteristics of banks’
short-term and long-term liabilities are useful in order to explain empirical findings in
the next chapters.
3.3. Evolution of bank regulation
Although banking activities close to modern banking were being carried out in Europe
starting from 12th century, regulation of these activities was not the case during those
times. Like all other business activities banking was also being protected by general
laws. Scale of these activities was not such large as today; therefore there was no need
for specific supervision. As paper money replaced metal money banks expanded their
activities and occupied larger proportions in their national economies. Invention of
different kind of securities stimulated the development of bank sector in further stages.
Need for supervision of banking system soon became inevitable since bank activities
influenced economies by being main financers. First central banks were formed in order
to finance government projects, which included mainly wars, trade and commerce.
World’s first central bank is considered Sveriges Riksbank which was established in
1668. (Sparve 1998:345) This bank was formed as a joint stock bank with two
departments: one responsible for lending government funds and another responsible for
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clearing activities. Established in 1694, Bank of England was more powerful than
Swedish central bank. Originally it was aimed to finance Britain’s long lasting war with
France by purchasing rising government debts. Further central banks established in
other countries of Europe, America, Japan and former colonies of British Empire
adopted Bank of England’s model. Along with financing government activities, first
central banks were also involved in other banking activities like commercial banks.
They also provided secure vault system for the deposits of other commercial banks. By
increasing power of central governments and rising importance of banking sector
central banks became more influential. Thus, their influence area grew significantly as
they evolved through their first establishments. (Bordo 2007, Kindleberger 2009:66)
Bank supervision did not require many efforts when first central banks were established.
Since monetary systems were tied to gold reserves, banks were allowed to issue loans
equivalent to the value of gold they possess. Therefore, it was enough for central banks
to check the availability of gold resources of banks in order to decide whether they act
according  to  rules  or  not.  Moreover,  as  the  amount  of  money supply  in  economy was
tied to gold reserves, prices were also tied to gold through this system. Hence, prices in
economy as a whole were sensitive to the price of one commodity-gold. Therefore the
major goal of bank supervision during those times was to provide price stability in
economy. (Bordo 2007)
Traditionally bank regulation in Europe was different from US in the way that
regulatory rules in US are written clearly and there are strict punishments for violating
these rules. However, bank regulations in European countries have mainly advisory
characteristics and banks are mainly free in their activities unless they are of criminal
actions. Although Bank of England was one of the oldest central banks in the World, it
served primarily as British Government’s bank and was chartered to print banknotes.
Nevertheless, changing conditions of economy made the government to think about
applying some regulations to banking sector. Thus the first important legal act to
regulate activities of banks was Banking Act of 1979. The act defined institutions which
can accept deposits and therefore clearly draw the line between bank and non-bank
institutions.
Banking Act of 1987 improved and replaced the act of 1979. It defined the regulatory
actions for deposit taking institutions, introduced deposit protection scheme and
provided explanations of banking institutions. Further this act was replaced by the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. FSMA 2000 defines game rules for financial
institutions more clearly than previous acts. This act also defined the duties of Financial
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Services Authority which was established in 2001 and became one of three bank
regulatory bodies in UK-Bank of England, Financial Services Authority and Treasury.
However, miserable consequences of the recent financial crisis made the British
government to look through its banking regulatory policies and FSA was replaced by
two different institutions: Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct
Authority in 2013. The British government also passed the Banking Act 2009 which lets
government to take over banks temporarily when needed. These latest developments in
bank regulation in UK changed the traditional way of controlling bank activities.
Although there were several attempts to set a control over banking sector in US, it was
not systematically carried out until the establishment of Federal Reserve System in
1913. The First and Second Banks of the United States were first government banks of
US. However their charters were not supported and prolonged for further periods. There
was a time period without bank regulations, when banks in each state printed their own
banknotes. This caused inflation increase and mess in financial system. Panic of 1907
raised the discussions about the necessity for a central bank of the United States. It was
the time when stock indices fell significantly and it accompanied with rush bank runs.
(Minneapolis Fed 2013)
Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 in order to regulate US banking
system. However, the Great Depression revealed that Fed is not providing efficient bank
regulation. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 established Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and drew a line between commercial and investment banking. Banks
should  define  clearly  which  activity  they  will  carry  out,  investment  banking  or
commercial banking, thereafter. Moreover, they must keep some amount of their
deposits in FDIC as a guarantee for possible future crises. (Walter B. Wriston Archives
2007)
Despite these developments there have not been clear capital adequacy ratios for banks
in US until 1980s. US government was concerned about decreasing capital ratios of
large banks. Therefore, new acts on bank regulation were passed in order to improve
capital regulations. Figure 7 shows how the proportion of equity in banks’ capital has
fallen from 1840. It might be claimed that creation of FDIC had negatively affected
banks’ equity. Thus, securitization of deposits by government with trivial amounts let
banks to attract more deposit customers, i.e. deposits became less costly. (Minneapolis
Fed 2013, Tarullo 2011, Walter B. Wriston Archives 2007)
Increasing importance of international financing and deepening integration among
countries through international organizations made big industrial nations think about
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common regulation standards in banking in late 1980s. Consequently the Group of Ten
(G-10) countries agreed on common banking regulations in 1988. Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS) which was established by these countries in 1974 adopted
the common standards for bank regulation, which is mainly known as Basel I. These
standards set capital requirements for banks and differentiate risk weights for assets of
banks. Basel I sets the minimum capital ratio for banks as 8% of risk-weighted assets,
where at least 4% must be covered by the Tier 1 capital. (BCBS 1988, Santos 2001)
Figure 7. Equity as a percentage of assets (Source: Berger et al.1995:402).
Although there are different kinds of risks in banking Basel I primarily focuses on the
most important one-credit risk. It also distinguishes among assets by country transfer
risk which defines OECD countries less risky. Though central governments and central
banks of all other countries are also recognized to have zero risk according to Basel I,
claims on other industries are distinguished according to the riskiness of specific
country. Basel I defines bank assets to have a failure risk with 0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, and
100%. It also distinguishes between on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet assets for
calculating risk weighted assets. Off-balance sheet assets are converted to their on-
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balance sheet assets in order to make calculation possible. Risk-weighted assets can be
summarized as follows:
· Assets  with  0%  risk-cash,  debts  of  central  governments  and  central  banks  of
OECD and any other countries,
· Assets with 0%, 10%, 20% and 50% risk-claims on public sector except central
governments,
· Assets with 20% risk-debts of international development banks, debts of OECD
banks,  debts  of  banks  outside  OECD  with  remaining maturity up to one year,
debts of non-OECD public sector companies and cash in collection,
· Assets with 50% risk-residential real estate collateralized loans,
· Assets with 100% risk-All other assets including private sector debt, private
sector debt of non-OECD countries with maturity more than one year, PPE, etc.
(BCBS 1988)
Apparently first Basel Accords were lacking more accurate calculation of asset risks and
they were not dealing with other important risks that banks face. Although there were
some amendments to Basel I in further years there was a need for more sophisticated
rules in bank regulation. Hence, second Basel Accords were introduced in 2004 and
became legally active in EU with the Capital Requirements Directive.
Basel II consists of three pillars of bank regulation: Minimum capital requirements,
Supervisory review process and Market discipline. The first pillar-Minimum capital
requirements-introduces accurate methods for calculating minimum capital. It enhances
Basel I by distinguishing among two more risks for banks along with credit risk; these
are operational risk and market risk. Credit risk can be measured by standardized
approach, internal ratings-based approach and advanced internal ratings-based
approach. Operational risks rise from the probability of the failure of software systems,
unintentional hazards by employees, i.e. extraordinary actions. Basic indicator
approach, standardized approach and advanced measurement approach are three
methods that Basel II suggests to measure operational risks. Finally, market risk can be
measured by standardized methods and internal models approach. (BCBS 2006, ANZ
2011) Moreover, Basel II provides formulas for calculating these risks.
The second pillar of Basel II provides guidance for bank regulators in order to control if
banks  follow  the  rules  set  by  the  first  pillar.  It  identifies  more  risks  related  to  bank
operations, such as concentration risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, strategic risk,
reputation risk etc. It also defines corporate governance standards for banks. Finally, the
third pillar of Basel II aims to provide more information about bank’s operations in
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market in order to maintain transparency. This will let the counterparts to measure and
evaluate the failure risks more accurately. The last pillar is also important in order to
prevent illegal bank actions like money laundry, financing of terrorism and illegal
weapon trade. (BCBS 2006)
Despite the fact that it was legally applied in EU, many scholars and finance people
criticized Basel II because of its risk based approach to assets. Thus, opponents of Basel
Accords claim that its rating based approach caused high reliance on rating agencies
which loosened the process of lending. Banks choose to trust to rating agencies rather
than spending time on evaluating their risks themselves. Also complexities of
innovative financial instruments led banks to follow this attitude. Therefore, there was
information  gap  between banks  and  its  customers.  Moreover,  the  rules  set  by  Basel  II
were too complicated that it took several years for large banks to adopt it. Apparently,
concerns of scholars were justified when Basel II could not prevent the severe results of
the recent financial crisis.
The third Basel Accords introduce tighter capital requirements for banks. First of all,
Basel III gives new definition of capital, where some capital instruments are excluded
from Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Hence, recent financial crisis revealed that some capital
instruments like, deferred tax credits, goodwill, complex bonds “evaporating” during
recessions and are no longer liquid in order to pay for bills. Secondly, Basel III
introduces new capital classification for anti-crises purposes such as capital
conservation buffer and countercyclical buffer. Banks must maintain extra 2.5% capital
as a buffer for future possible crises in addition to its total capital. The ratio of total
capital is not changed and remains 8%, however there is a shift to Tier 1 capital. Thus,
Tier 1 capital must be at least 6%, while it was only 4% during previous Basel regimes.
Additionally,  Basel  III  gives  right  to  bank  supervisors  to  ask  banks  hold  more  capital
during rising credit growth. This capital is called countercyclical buffer and it may vary
between 0% and 2.5%. Therefore during credit booms banks’ capital might rise up to
13% which is much higher than all previous capital requirements. All these ratios are
measured by risk-weighted assets. In addition to these ratios there is another capital
ratio set by Basel III, called elaborate ratio which measures the ratio of capital to total
consolidated assets without risk weighting; it must be minimum of 3%. (BCBS 2011)
Basel III also introduces absolutely new regulation tool which was not available in
previous accords. Banks must meet the minimum amount of Liquidity coverage ratio
(LCR) in order to guarantee short-term shocks. Basel III requires banks to have LCR of
100% by the end of the year of 2018. Another instrument of liquidity regulation is Net
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stable funding ratio (NSFR) which requires minimum amount of stable funds in order to
guarantee sufficient resources. This requirement is suspended until the end of 2017.
(BCBS 2011) Figure 8 shows the timeline for the new capital and liquidity requirements
to be met by banks.
Additionally to all capital requirements Systematically Important Financial Institutions
(SIFIs) must hold extra 1%-2.5% capital depending on their systemic importance in
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order to meet loss absorbency requirements. SIFIs are the financial institutions whose
failure might cause extremely severe losses not only for financial sector but also for
whole economy. Collapse of Lehman Brothers and its consequences made the bank
supervisors to pay more attention to these institutions. SIFIs are defined each year by
Financial Stability Board according to clearly stated measurement tools.
New very strict requirements agreed by the governments of 27 countries were not
welcomed by the bankers of those countries. Obviously, new rules made it significantly
expensive for banks make money. Therefore, there were long lasting discussions around
new regulations. Some large banks, especially US ones called new rules unacceptable
and impossible to meet. Specifically JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon called new
rules “blatantly anti-American” and asked US government not to apply new rules in US.
In solidarity with US bankers some congressmen called US Senate not to pass the bill
adopting new Basel Accords obligatory in US. Antagonists of Basel III also claimed
that new rules will cut about 10 million jobs and will slow economic growth. Moreover,
many banking associations in US warned that small community banks cannot adopt new
standards because it will be difficult for them to collect capital. A study by PwC shows
that capital ratios of some large us banks including JPMorgan Chase were lower than
required by new standards. Therefore it is obvious why they opposed new requirements.
Despite these opposing attitudes in US, British and Swedish governments welcomed
new rules  and  announced  that  they  want  to  apply  more  strict  rules  for  their  banks,  as
banking and financial sectors occupies significantly large proportion of their economy.
Consequently all the developments made BCBS to prolong the deadline for meeting the
liquidity requirements. (Kanter and Castle 2012, Sorkin 2013, Masters 2013, PwC
2011)
3.4.  Different practices in bank regulation
Although Basel Accords set clear game rules for the banks of participating countries
there are still many differences in bank regulations across these countries. This is
mainly because of the different evolution ways of banking industries through history
affected by local conditions divergently. Traditionally banks were affected much by
regulations in the countries with social-democratic economic models. In contrast banks
in  liberal  economies  such  as  UK  and  US  have  not  faced  strict  regulations  from  the
beginning of their operations. However recent financial crisis made liberal economies
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also shift to stricter regulations in banking sector. Therefore, it is important to pay
attention how banks are regulated and supervised in different countries.
Banking system of the European Union constitutes many financial institutions operating
in both macroeconomic (union) and microeconomic (countries) levels and characterized
by the complexity of regulations. Main institution for bank regulation and supervision in
the European Union is the European Banking Authority (EBA). Main goals of EBA are
to maintain safe and sound banking system, provide common prudential rules for all EU
banks and evaluate risks and susceptibility of EU banks.  While EBA’s main role is  to
provide advisory and supervisory services EU legislations ensure compulsory rules for
all EU banks. National authorities are responsible for implementing and supervising EU
legislations for their banks. Bank regulatory and supervisory authorities in almost all
EU countries are similar.  Thus they consist  of National (Central)  Banks and Financial
Supervisory Authorities. National Banks consider EBA’s recommendations and apply
EU rules for bank regulations in local level. Moreover, they can set stricter capital and
other adequacy requirements than set by EU legislation for the banks in their own
jurisdiction if they believe it will provide more secure baking system. Norway, Iceland
and Switzerland which belong to Europe geographically but are not EU members also
have similar banking system. However EU legislations and other EU bank regulatory
bodies are not able to affect their bank regulation choice. Despite this all these countries
apply  common  regulatory  rules  set  by  Basel  Committee  on  Bank  Supervision  and
therefore have similar approach to capital adequacy requirements.
Being the main authority responsible for financial stability in Euro zone, European
Central  Bank also sets certain rules for the participants of financial  sector.  Along with
capital  requirements  Minimum  Reserve  Requirement  is  one  of  the  main  tools  to
maintain macroeconomic stability. European Central Bank is the responsible body for
defining Minimum Reserve Requirements. Despite the fact that this tool is applied in
almost  all  countries  and  is  of  utmost  importance,  some  countries  do  not  use  it  at  all.
Historical development of UK economy and traditional capitalist approach led to loose
regulations in financial sector as well. Not only the Bank of England did not set the
minimum reserve requirements, it did not even define clear capital regulation rules from
the beginning of banking industry. Banks are not obliged to keep some proportion of
deposits in the accounts with the Bank of England; however they can do so and receive
interest  for  holding  deposits  in  BoE.  Similar  to  UK  Norwegian  and  Swedish  central
banks do not apply MRR regulatory tool for banks as well. Nevertheless, Central Bank
of Norway or Norges Bank defines thresholds for holding deposits in its accounts for
the banks operating in Norway. So called Quota System allows banks to get interests for
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defined portions of the deposits that they hold in the accounts with Norges Bank. Banks
who hold more deposits than set by Quota System get lower interests for the proportions
exceeding the quota. This system stimulates banks not to hold large amounts of deposits
and expand their businesses. (Øystein 2013)
Another noteworthy tool of bank capital regulation is setting up minimum initial capital
standards for starting banking business and also setting minimum equity capital
standard for existing banks. This tool should be distinguished from minimum capital
adequacy ratios in the way that it sets capital requirements in the terms of currency. For
instance, country A may set a minimum initial capital requirement for those who want
to get a bank charter of 1000 euro. This requirement will be minimum equity capital
requirement for already existing banks.  The tool is  widely used in the economies with
weak banking industries and in those who newly introduced market economy. Thus,
minimum initial capital requirement is applied as a strong regulatory tool in CIS
countries. For instance, in Russia current requirement is 300 million rubles which is
equivalent to approximately 7 million euro. In Azerbaijan, another CIS country, this
number is approximately 48 million euro. Apparently small and developing economies
are tend to have more strict regulations in order to maintain macroeconomic stability
which is much sensitive to changing conditions. Nevertheless, this tool is not widely
used as a regulatory instrument in the countries with stronger banking industries such as
UK,  US  and  Western  European  countries.  Initial  capital  requirement  acts  as  the
assurance for banking authorities that the newly established banks will be able to carry
out the activities and functions in a minimum level. (Central Bank of Azerbaijan
Republic 2012, Abdullaev 2011)
Prior to joining the Euro zone Estonia’s monetary policy was fairly different from other
classical monetary policy approaches. Thus, Estonia did not apply central bank interest
rates as a tool to influence money supply in economy. Estonian monetary system was
based on fixed exchange rate regime against the euro with currency board arrangement.
Due to currency board arrangement the Bank of Estonia did not implement independent
monetary policy, i.e. the money supply in Estonia was endogenously determined by
money demand. Central Bank of Estonia was not involved in open market operation and
did not influence money supply by selling bonds or by setting interest rates. Since
Estonia’s banking system is exclusively dominated by foreign investors, fixed exchange
rate policy was quite effective in order to influence money supply flowing from other
countries. This unique regulation cannot be applied widely because it constitutes
particular characteristics of certain country’s (Estonia) economy. (Taniloo 2013)
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Being one of the regulatory bodies of financial system comprising Council of Financial
Regulators (CFR), Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is the key
institution for bank supervision. APRA sets special regulation in order to identify risk
and supervise certain financial institutions, including banks, to prevent possible serious
consequences of future crises. APRA applies dualistic regulatory and supervisory
system in order to maintain safe and sound banking activities. The first pillar of this
system is Probability and Impact Rating System (PAIRS) which evaluates the riskiness
of financial institutions. The second pillar is Supervisory Oversight and Response
System (SOARS) defines further supervisory activities to be carried out to overcome
these risks. According to PAIRS in order to determine the probability of failure banks
are categorized into different groups by the riskiness of different classes such as board,
management, liquidity, earnings, additional capital, total capital etc. These categories
are summed up to overall risk of a financial institution and the final risk rate is
calculated. Final step of PAIRS is to calculate possible consequences of the financial
institution  according  to  its  risk.  In  the  next  step  according  to  SOARS  principles
institutions are grouped in four different treatment classes for their PAIRS assessments.
The supervisory activities to be implemented are defined by the institutions’ belongings
to these groups. Unlike private rating agencies’ rating experience, which was questioned
after latest crisis, APRA’s dualistic system relying also on ratings is more trustworthy.
Thus, it is stricter and does not represent private interests and therefore more accurate.
(APRA 2012)
Although Basel Accords reduced the differences of regulation among countries,
discrepancies in approach to bank supervision and macroeconomic stability regulation
still exists. Therefore banks’ performance and readiness to crises vary across countries
according to the characteristics of supervision and control. However, this study does not
cover very diverse countries for empirical tests. Hence, the results of the tests are
expected not to be affected by discrepancies in regulation.
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4. FINANCIAL CRISIS AND INTEGRATION OF MARKETS
Although six years have passed since the first signs of the worst global financial crisis
after great depression many countries still suffer from imbalances it has caused.
Therefore, it is still interesting and debatable topic for scholars to discuss the factors
that  caused  the  crisis.  All  points  of  views  of  scholars  come to  agreement  in  one  point
that the crisis was originated from US real estate market which was closely tied to
financial sector through various channels. Since the US economy is entwined with other
developed economies of the world very tight, the crisis stroke many countries as well.
As the result of economic integration and globalization of world economy the crisis has
shocked developing countries in its further stages. The main purpose of this chapter is to
discuss major factors that triggered the crisis and the reasons why it has spread globally.
4.1. Conditions before the crisis and its occurrence
As the epicenter of the crisis, economic and social conditions in US have started and
triggered its further development. Traditionally US people are prone to have their own
homes. Home ownership is considered as the start of independent personal life of US
young people. Although most of the families contribute in buying new residence for
their children, it is still not enough to cover the whole amount. Therefore, there is
always high demand to housing loans in the United States. By knowing this attitude of
people US banks were willing to increase their returns with more mortgage loans when
the interest rates were really low in the beginning of 2000s. Undoubtedly, US
government  was  also  aware  of  this  attitude  of  their  people  and  they  were  trying  to
stimulate the economy by cutting of interest rates and hence prospering real estate
market.
Merrouche and Nier (2010) argue that the main factor that triggered the crisis was the
loose monetary policy of US government for relatively long time period. Low interest
rates let the banks take more risks and issue more loans; they lead the banks to borrow
more in order to finance the growing demands for loans; and finally lead the prices of
real estate rise as it was reachable by many people under these conditions. Interest rates
were fluctuating around 1% in early 2000s (BBC News 2009), which made the
mortgage lending more attractive.
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Merrouche and Nier (2010) further argue that disproportions in global economy were
another reason to trigger the crisis. This argument is also supported by Lin and Treichel
(2012), where they state that the attitude of fast growing economies like, Russia, China,
Brazil, India and Southeastern Asian countries, to support their economies by increasing
export led to high amount of capital inflows to those countries. High capital inflows
increased the credit supply and reduced the interest rates in those economies. Therefore,
banks  of  these  countries  were  also  willing  to  increase  their  profits  by  increasing  their
leverage under those competition conditions.
While discussing the main reasons of the crisis, Taylor (2009) states loose monetary
policy of Fed as the major contributor. Apparently, Fed had violated the Taylor rule,
which defines Fed’s interest rate policy in response to changing economic and monetary
conditions in economy. Taylor (2009) states that very low Fed interest rate, about 1%,
was the major contributor of extremely large cash inflows to the US economy. Very
sharp rise of interest rates right after 2004 led to default of many borrowers whose loans
were tied to floating rates. Although discussions about Fed’s attitude towards interest
rates are not important in this paper, it is worth to highlight its main reason.
Figure 9. Federal Reserve interest rates 2001-2007.
Figure 9 shows how sharply interest rates were falling until 2004. This happened mainly
in order to support US war in Afghanistan and Iraq. US government believed that they
can support national military industry and other industries related to it by lowering
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interest rates. Apparently this policy was efficient for some 3-4 years as Figure 9 shows.
Thus, the government have understood the existence of very large proportions of money
supply in economy and decided to increase the interest rates. Of course it has stopped
the flow of money to economy, but it also worsened the repayment capabilities of lower
class borrowers.
In order to understand how mortgage lending in US caused the worst crisis after Great
Depression, one first needs to understand how the actions carried out by financial
institutions related to mortgage lending look like. Before explaining the process the
terms MBS, CDO, CDS and SPV should be defined. Mortgage backed security (MBS)
is issued by a financial institutions backed by mortgages, which are sold to another
financial institution in exchange for cash. They can be classified by the quality of the
customers included, from high rated to low rated MBS. Collateralized debt obligations
(CDO) are formed by pooling MBS and other asset backed securities in order to form
new security; they are also rated from low risk to high risk groups. Credit default swap
(CDS) is a contract where seller takes the responsibility to pay the principal of a loan to
buyer in the case of the loan’s default. Special purpose vehicle (SPV) or special purpose
entity is established to carry out projects that need special effort and management in
order to detach risk from main company. In this model SPVs are involved in issuing
CDOs for investment banks.
Different mortgage banks, mortgage loan officers and the mortgage customers form the
first  stage  of  the  model.  As  interest  rates  fall,  banks  want  to  make  more  profit  by
increasing their portfolios. Since most of the customers with good credit history already
have mortgages banks are interested to issue mortgages to so called sub-prime
customers who have bad credit history or do not have it at all. In order to meet the high
demand to mortgage loans banks hire a lot of new mortgage loan officers who are paid
basically for their performance, i.e. the more they have portfolio the more they are paid.
In most cases this attitude leaves the quality of customer to the second priority and leads
to misinforming the bank and fraud. Of course due in the loans reduce their premiums.
However, most of sub-prime customers are able to repay the loans in early periods;
therefore those loan officers do not face major changes in their premiums.
Participants of the second stage of the model are mortgage issuing banks, investment
banks, rating agencies and SPVs. In this stage mortgage issuing banks pool up the
mortgages in order to form MBS for further fund raising. MBS are formed from
customers with different repayment capabilities and therefore are rated differently. The
holders of high rated MBS get their payments first, and the low rated MBSs last.
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However, low rated MBS promise high returns, which make them attractive for
investors. These MBS are sold to investment banks that transfer them to SPVs in order
to form new securities-CDO. Together with other asset backed securities possessed by
investment banks MBS are pooled and CDOs are formed with new risk groups. Another
investment bank includes these CDOs in new pool of securities in order to create new
CDO which increases the risk significantly. The riskiness of these securities is defined
by reliable rating agencies thereafter. However, apparently these ratings were not that
reliable mainly because of the complexity and sometimes inability of the measuring the
risk. The investment banks buy CDS in order to offset their risks against defaults.
Therefore, other financial institutions which issue CDS were also involved in this chain.
When Fed interest rates start rising, as it happened in 2004, floating rates of mortgages
also rise; as a result most of the sub-prime borrowers face difficulties in repayment of
their loans. Therefore, the holders of low rated securities might not get their premiums.
Consequently defaults in mortgages affect all participants in this chain. But how the
failures in this trivial proportion of US financial assets lead to catastrophic results for
the  whole  world?  Eichengreen,  Mody,  Nedeljkovic  and  Sarno  (2009)  state  that  at  the
time  of  crisis  total  amount  of  US  mortgages  was  equal  to  3%  of  US  financial  assets.
They argue that financial institutions in US tend to show similar behaviors to changing
conditions. As a result, rising interest rates after 2004 worsened their capabilities to
borrow and refinance. Since most of big investment banks were involved in investing to
CDOs  and  MBS,  the  failure  of  the  system  affected  all  of  the  actors.  According  to
Diamond and Rajan (2009) the mass failure of these securities dropped their price
significantly, and even short-term lending became difficult for banks. Further, the loss
of trust to banks by people and by other banks as well caused harsh bank runs and even
suspension of interbank lending. Interbank lending restored after intervention of central
banks and ministries of finance but the rates became significantly high. First attempts to
save the economy did not give any important returns. As a result the crisis widened in a
short time and went global in further years.
4.2. Further development of the crisis and its consequences
The  first  signs  of  crisis  were  observed  when  New  Century  Financial,  sub-prime
mortgage issuer, reduced its employees to half under US bankruptcy legislation and
Bear Stearns released tensed information for its investors in April, 2007. Further BNP
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Paribas releases the information about the concerns of the liquidity of some of its funds.
Although most of the Northern Rock’s mortgages were financed by market operations
released information and uncertainties of markets lead to the bank run in this company.
Ultimately, the UK government had to intervene in order to decrease bank run in
Northern  Rock.  Later  in  October  of  the  same year  UBS,  a  Swiss  bank,  and  Citigroup
revealed billions of losses in their sub-prime activities. These developments promised
no more positive change for the deepening crisis. Hence, in the beginning of 2008 Bear
Stearns, an investment bank, bankrupted and was bought by JPMorgan Chase for only $
10 per share, whereas the price per share was fluctuating around $ 130 before the crisis.
As most of the scholars and financial experts agree Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was
the triggering event which led the crisis last longer and spread around the globe.
Lehman Brothers was involved mainly in investing in asset backed securities like
CDOs. Therefore current conditions in the market affected it much. The company was
highly levered and faced difficulties when the asset price boom ended in US
simultaneously with the rising number of defaults in mortgage loans. As a highly
levered company with CDOs the process affected it significantly and the company had
to announce its bankruptcy in September 2008. Although the US government carried
out bailout plans to liquidate financial markets they did not saved Lehman Brothers
from bankruptcy. This event led the distrust among financial market participants and the
rise of LIBOR rates. Bartram and Bodnar (2009) show that the volatility in markets
raised  up  to  70% right  after  the  failure  of  Lehman Brothers.  The  number  explains  the
rate of distress and uncertainty in financial markets. Following the default of Lehman
Brothers equity market indices fell about 50% compared to their 2006 year end rates.
Reaction of the stock indices was also similar: Dow Jones dropped as much as it fell
after September 11 attacks. Consequently Barclays Plc acquired the trading assets and
liabilities, and headquarters of Lehman Brothers when the negotiations on acquisition
between them failed. Japanese Nomura Holding acquired its European and Middle
Eastern equities and investment operations. (Eichengreen et al. 2009, Bartram and
Bodnar 2009)
As the crisis was spreading through economies, governments were carrying out new
rescue plans for financial sectors and for the whole economy as well. Although there
were several attempts to overcome and slow the crisis along with bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, several factors caused its expansion further. Following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers the US government passed a bill called Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(EESA) in October of 2008, which formally allowed them to carry out stabilization
activities  of  Troubled  Asset  Relief  Program  (TARP).  According  to  TARP  the  US
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Congress authorized the use of $ 700 billion in order to stabilize worsened economic
conditions and prevent further spread of the crisis. However the revised amount of the
aid to economy was reduced to 475 billion by Dodd-Frank act of 2010. (US Department
of the Treasury 2013) Initially TARP authorized the US government to finance
problematic assets in the amount of $ 700 billion.  Under EESA problematic assets are
the assets which fall under these criteria:
· Residential and commercial mortgages and securities related to them,
· Other financial instruments which are agreed with Fed and US Congress.
TARP allowed the US Treasury to purchase illiquid assets and shares of financial
institutions in order to recover the activity of financial markets and restore pre-crisis
trading in the markets. The program aimed to stimulate market trading of securities and
increase their price in order to get their values back to pre-crisis terms. Moreover,
TARP targeted to restore the trustworthiness among banks which was lost during the
crisis and attracted on LIBOR rates. It aimed to decrease the LIBOR rates and
consequently increase inter-bank lending and lending to the economy. Financial
institutions participating in TARP are obliged to buy their assets and/or equity back
when the liquidity is restored. Apparently the program reached its goals in preventing
the spread and lasting of the crisis more. As of July 2013 95% of the spending financed
by the program is paid back: from $ 420 billion of allocated funds $ 400.5 billion
returned. (US Department of the Treasury 2013)
Loose credit regulations in US economy affected not only its own economy but also
other countries, mainly European ones. As a result of economic imbalances in the
United States many weak countries faced crucial problems with financing in their
economies. Undoubtedly one of the major crises in European countries happened in
Iceland which led to fail its banking system and government bailout of all three major
commercial banks in the country. Icelandic banks were enjoying excess flow of capital
from US and Europe in the beginning of 2000s. Therefore, they were highly dependent
on foreign financing. However in domestic economy banks were lending in national
currency, Icelandic Kron (ISK). This attitude increased exchange rate risks for all three
major Icelandic banks significantly. Hence, when the Icelandic currency depreciated in
value, the repayments by national customers who borrowed from banks in ISK were not
able to cover the banks’ debts to foreign financers. In essence the Icelandic economy
borrowed too much from international financial institutions compared to its GDP and
changing economic conditions triggered its failure as well. Consequently the
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government of Iceland took over these banks and the problem was solved by
government guarantee over these banks’ debts.
As a major economic partner of US, European Union was affected by the imbalances in
US economy as severely as the United States. Peter Praet, Member of the Executive
Board of ECB, names two main reasons of the crisis in Eurozone originating from the
United States. Firstly, US mortgage market created too complicated securities which
were trading throughout the world. Secondly, collapse of Lehman Brothers froze trading
among financial institutions and led to distrust and uncertainty between them. European
banks were enjoying high inflow of capital from US during loose economic terms and
they were involved in the operations with complicated securities as well. Mainly these
two factors swayed inappropriate debt policies of EU states and lead to sovereign debt
crisis in Euro Area. (Praet 2013)
Figure 11. Long-term interest rates in some EU countries (Source: ECB)
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Anxiety and uncertainty in some countries with extremely high debts led to the increase
in interest rates for the debts which were financed from foreign financers. The cutting of
riskiness ratings by international rating agencies also triggered the process. As a result
highly levered countries of EU such as Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Portugal and
Ireland had to apply strict budget policies which in turn led social tensions in these
countries. Figure 11 shows how interest rates for long term governments change across
countries. Apparently, Greece was the most risky country with extremely high yields.
In order to prevent the crisis European Central Bank carried out important anti-crisis
acts. European Financial Stability Facility and European Stability Mechanism were
established to help the EU members suffering from sovereign debt problems. These two
organizations are aimed to provide easy funding to EU states during crises when rising
interest  rates  limit  their  ability  to  borrow.  Along  with  these  establishments  European
Central Bank introduced Long Term Refinancing Operations in order to increase
liquidity of money markets. Previously ECB was offering short-term financing which
was costly during crisis times. These programs and the actions carried out in national
level by governments improved the situation in EU pulled the tensions down.
To conclude, this crisis was the worst crisis after Great Depression. Immediate
responses by US and other leading economies prevented it to spread too deep in
economies. Developing countries became locomotives of the World economy after this
crisis. While most of the developed countries were experiencing sharp falls in GDP,
developing countries were still growing during these times. This crisis revealed
imbalances in world economy and also deep integration among capitalist countries.
Therefore, it is interesting to analyze how the economies of different countries are
integrated with each other. The next section investigates major points from integration
and correlation of economies.
4.3. Integration of economies
In order to measure how different economies are integrated with each other scholars
mainly investigated the movements of their stock markets. These movements are tested
through the level of their correlation. Another measure of economic integration is tested
through the reaction of equity markets and other important markets in one country to the
macroeconomic news announcements in another country. This section summarizes main
findings in integration of economies and their co-movements.
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Intuitively it might be claimed that there is a correlation between different markets
because otherwise investors can gain by arbitrage opportunities across different
countries. Although integration is week among some economies, most of the studies
show that markets are correlated and deeply integrated among several countries. Solnik,
Boucrelle  and  Le  Fur  (1996)  show that  correlation  of  economies  of  Switzerland,  UK,
Japan, France and Germany with US have increased significantly over 37 years. They
explain it with economic policies applied in these countries. They also state that due to
the cooperation through EU the economies of France and Germany integrated and
highly correlated. Their findings also show that when volatility increases correlation
among these economies also increase. This finding lets us to claim that rising financial
imbalances in one of these countries may alter stocks and therefore economy in other
countries.
Before Solnik et al. (1996), King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994) find that there is no
integration among stock markets of different countries; therefore investors can gain by
diversification. However they do not reject the existence of integration among
economies. Unlike King et al. (1994) Longin and Solnik (2001) find correlation in
stocks in “bull’s markets.” They find out that as the returns become extremely low
correlations between stocks increase. This finding is interesting in order to explain high
stock losses during economic recessions and crises.
Correlation  of  the  stock  markets  of  developed  countries  with  US  stock  markets  rose
significantly from 1980s to 1990s. These changes might be explained firstly by the
attitudes of investors. Thus, an American investor is not only playing in a local scale,
but  they  invest  also  in  the  stocks  of  other  countries.  This  attitude  is  also  true  for  a
German, Dutch, English investor as well. Therefore, the interests are co-integrated and
market movements show similar patterns. Another reason of the rising correlation is
global diversification in financing and production. If we take into account the number of
multinational companies operating in different countries and therefore deeply integrated
to economies it can be claimed that they can cause the stocks move together. Despite all
the developments these changes in correlations can be a temporary process related to
rapid growth of stock markets. (Brooks and Del Negro 2004) Figure 12 demonstrates
changes in correlation coefficients between US stock markets and the stock markets of
several countries.
Studies show that correlation among stock markets do not stay still all time, they change
and react to changing economic and other conditions. Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1994)
find that even during rising globalization and economic integration period correlation
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Figure 12. Correlation coefficients of stock markets (Source: Brooks and Del Negro
2004)
among countries can decline. Their findings reveal that economic recessions happening
at the same time in different countries increase the correlation between stock markets.
This finding is similar to Longin and Solnik’s (2001) finding, and can affirm that bad
economic conditions in one country can affect other country’s economy significantly.
On the other hand economies are less correlated during good times. Apparently, markets
are more concerned about bad times than good times.
Findings of the paper by Graham, Kiviaho and Nikkinen (2012) is interesting in terms
of explaining co-integration of US stock markets with emerging countries’ stock
markets. Mainly they find co-movement of markets of these countries in the long-term.
However, there are no strong relations of the markets for short time period. This finding
is important to explain why developed countries were affected first and much by the
crisis. As the crisis lasted longer in developed countries it affected emerging markets as
well. However, it did not stop their economic growth unlike in developed countries.
Apparently, less integration and willingness to develop their economies independently
let the emerging countries to prevent extreme results of the crisis.
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Reaction of markets in one country to the release of macroeconomic news in another
one can also explain much about integration of economies. For instance, German
government bonds are sensitive to US macroeconomic news. This can be explained by
the role of US in global economy and its being a financial center of the World. It can be
also explained by deep integration of US companies to Europe and specifically to
Germany in this case. In both cases obviously US macroeconomic news has impact on
German bonds. (Andersson, Overby, Sebestyen 2009) Of course these findings can
explain movements of German and other European markets in response to US anti-crisis
actions. Thus, emission of big amount of dollars in order to carry out bailout plans in
US can be perceived as inflation risk in Germany. Moreover, increase in Initial Jobless
Claims in US can cause German bonds depreciate in value. These behaviors of markets
also explain why the crisis originating from US can raise economic and social tensions
in Europe.
The purpose of this section was to find enough evidence from studies by different
scholars in order to prove the existence of co-movements of markets of different
countries. As it can be observed there are correlations among markets in many countries
and they are high in some specific countries. Moreover, most studies reveal that
correlations increase during economic recessions or shocks such as crises. Therefore the
question “Why a crisis happening in the United States caused similar bad results in
Europe?” can be answered by these findings with confidence. It is worth to mention that
the economies of developed countries are too integrated that rising tensions and shocks
should not be considered as internal affairs of one country. Therefore, further steps to
eliminate the results of latest crisis and prevent future crises must be carried out by the
contributions of all developed countries. Obviously as the locomotives of global growth
during latest crisis, large emerging markets should also act along with these countries.
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter clarifies the data, methodology and variables’ explanation for the empirical
tests of the study. First section provides comprehensive explanation of the variables
used for econometric models. The second section of the chapter illustrates sources of
data used for the study and their collection method. Moreover, it explains the data and
provides descriptive statistics about it. Applied methodology for the empirical tests and
description of econometric models are explained in the last section of the chapter.
Detailed description of the applied methodology refers to the textbook by Wooldridge
(2008) and Gujarati (2004).
5.1. Explanation of variables
Like other financial and non-financial firms in the economy, banks are affected by
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors. Therefore, it is important to explain these
factors separately in order to draw a clear image of these determinants. Since one of the
main  goals  of  this  study  is  to  find  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on  banks’  capital  structure,
dependent variable for econometric tests for the first and third hypotheses is chosen the
ratio of Equity to Total Assets. Since the data source was not able to provide sufficient
amount of observations for other capital ratios, Equity/Total Assets ratio is used. In
order to identify the impact of the crisis to short-term and long-term liabilities of banks
two ratios are chosen as dependent variables, ratio of Deposits and Short-term funding
to Total Assets and the ratio of Long-term funding to Total Assets. Dependent variable
for the last hypothesis is the percentage change of capital structure measured by
Equity/Total Assets.
Independent variables: Bank specific factors. Although, there are many bank specific
factors affecting banks’ capital structure choice, the most important and interesting ones
are chosen for this study. These include:
Total Assets: This variable is important in order to determine the impact of bank size to
capital structure choice. While banks grow they tend to increase their leverage and issue
more loans in order to increase their revenues and the variety of operations. This
variable measures if bank size factor has shown different patterns around the latest
financial crisis.
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Net Income, Net Interest Revenue, Non-interest Income. When banks observe their
revenues increase over time they believe that their capital structure policy is efficient
and they are willing to support it by attracting more sources of funding in order to
maintain the growth of their income. It is also important to distinguish interest income
and non-interest income in order to make conclusion which of these have been affecting
banks during financial crisis. Interest income is important for the banks which rely
mainly on classical banking, i.e. issuing loans, while non-interest income is important
for non-classical and large banks, which apply innovative banking activities. Therefore,
these variables will let to make conclusions about these two different types of banks.
Ratio of Loan Loss Reserves to Gross Loans. This variable is also important in order to
observe the impact of the crisis to the quality of issued loans. It is expected that this
ratio will show significant impact on capital structure not only during the crisis but also
the subsequent period. Since the loan losses are not covered in a short time, this variable
is expected to have longer impact.
Ratio of Customer Deposits to Total Assets, Ratio of Deposits from Banks to Total
Assets. Obviously during the crisis times banks usually lose their trustworthiness. This
happens not only because of their performance but also customers’ expectations.
Therefore, during crises deposits by customers decrease significantly and might lead to
illiquidity  of  banks  and  ultimately  to  failure.  Moreover,  recent  crisis  also  altered  trust
ties among banks themselves. Thus, interbank lending rate increased considerably and
also was suspended for some period during the crisis. Accordingly, these two variables
are expected to have significant impact on banks’ capital structure during crisis.
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) and Return on Average Equity (ROAE). These two
measures of bank profitability are included in the model in order to measure the impact
of crisis on banks’ capital structure. These variables along with GDP growth are proxies
for the financial crisis.
Independent variables: Macroeconomic factors. Main macroeconomic factors affecting
bank capital structure choice and other crucial decisions are Central Banks’ interest
rates and Minimum Reserve Requirements. Along with these two variables GDP growth
rate for countries are also included as the proxy for financial  crisis.  GDP growth rate,
ROAA and ROAE are most important variables throughout this study in order to define
the impact of crisis to bank capital structure. Finally, Government Effectiveness
indicator is included in the econometric models in order to measure how policies carried
out by government affect bank capital structure choice. Intuitively, good governance
must lead effective power of bank regulation and sound banking system which should
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influence banks’ capital structure in turn. Table 1 summarizes all dependent and
independent variables and provides brief description of them.
Table 1. Summary of dependent and independent variables.
Variables   Description
Dependent variables
E/TA Ratio of Equity to Total Assets
STL / TA Ratio of Deposits and Short-term liabilities to Total
Assets
LTL / TA Ratio of Long-term liabilities to Total Assets
Independent variables
Macroeconomic factors
GDP growth rate This variable is used as a proxy for crisis
MRR
Minimum reserve requirements by
Central Banks
Interest rates Interest rate of Central Banks
Government Effectiveness Measure of effectiveness of national governments
Bank specific factors
Total Assets Proxy for bank size
Net Income Bank income measure
Net Interest Revenue Bank income measure
Non-interest Income Bank income measure
Loan loss Reserves/Gross Loans Proxy for bad performance
Customer Deposits/TA Weight of Customer deposits
Bank Deposits/TA Weight of Bank deposits
ROAA Proxy for crisis along with ROAE and GDP
ROAE Proxy for crisis along with ROAA and GDP
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5.2. Data description
The data used for this study is mainly from Bankscope which is provided by Bureau
Van Dijk. Bankscope database contains very diverse information about banks’ assets
and liabilities, income statements, financial ratios, ratings, specialization, ownership,
stock  data  and  so  forth  for  30,000  banks  worldwide.  Information  about  banks’  total
assets, equity/total assets ratio, income measures, loan loss reserves, customer and bank
deposits, mortgage loans and profitability measures: ROAA, ROAE, are obtained from
Bankscope. Non-interest income is calculated as the sum of followings: other operating
income, net gains (losses) on trading derivatives, net fees and commissions, remaining
operating income. Since Bancsope contains very diverse financial firms, obtained data
was checked and central banks, government bank institutions for certain purpose,
multilateral banks formed by many countries and other regulatory financial institutions
were excluded from the final sample. As a result the sample includes commercial,
saving, real estate and mortgage banks, bank holding and holding companies,
cooperative banks, micro financing institutions, Islamic banks, investment banks,
private banking and asset management companies, group finance companies and
investment and trust corporations. Table 2 illustrates the number of certain bank types
and total number of individual banks for the whole sample.
Macroeconomic data information has been obtained from different data sources. Firstly,
GDP  growth  rates  by  countries  were  obtained  from  World  Bank  database.  This
information is based on annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based
on local currency of each country. Interest rates of central banks of the following
countries were obtained from DeltaStock database: Switzerland, Norway, Eurozone,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden. DeltaStock is
an authorized online FOREX and CFD broker regulated under MiFID (EU Directive
2004/39/EC). Information about other countries’ interest rates was obtained either from
the corresponding country’s central bank’s website or from annual reports of central
banks. Information about minimum reserve requirements was obtained from each
country’s central bank’s website or annual reports. MRR information about the
countries which joined Eurozone in later periods of sample was obtained from the
archives of their central banks. US have the system of minimum reserve requirements
with certain thresholds. Thus, to calculate minimum amount of reserves banks subtract
the deductable amounts from low-reserve tranche and hold 3% of this amount as
reserves in Federal Reserve Banks. If the amount is more than low-reserve tranche then
a bank must hold 10% of the amount exceeding 3% threshold as reserves. In order to
calculate the reserve requirements in terms of percentages the amounts to be hold by 3%
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Table 2. Information about number of banks and their types.
Countries Commercial
Banks
RE&M
Banks
Savings
Banks
Other
Banks
%RE&M
Banks
Total
Austria 71 17 97 137 5.28% 322
Belgium 31 2 6 31 2.86% 70
Cyprus 17 0 1 14 0.00% 32
Cz. Republic 19 2 0 5 7.69% 26
Denmark 41 9 40 13 8.74% 103
Estonia 7 0 0 3 0.00% 10
Finland 9 4 2 5 20.00% 20
France 122 27 27 133 8.74% 309
Germany 127 42 429 1061 2.53% 1659
Greece 12 0 0 4 0.00% 16
Hungary 28 4 0 4 11.11% 36
Iceland 7 2 10 6 8.00% 25
Ireland 14 6 0 28 12.50% 48
Italy 98 3 39 483 0.48% 623
Latvia 22 0 0 0 0.00% 22
Lithuania 11 0 0 0 0.00% 11
Luxembourg 70 1 2 32 0.95% 105
Malta 9 0 1 7 0.00% 17
Netherlands 32 7 1 32 9.72% 72
Norway 14 9 117 9 6.04% 149
Poland 45 0 1 7 0.00% 53
Portugal 25 1 4 16 2.17% 46
Romania 26 0 2 2 0.00% 30
Slovakia 13 2 2 2 10.53% 19
Slovenia 17 0 2 3 0.00% 22
Spain 51 1 25 84 0.62% 161
Sweden 26 9 55 16 8.49% 106
Switzerland 133 4 198 86 0.95% 421
UK 137 53 2 205 13.35% 397
USA 677 23 382 915 1.15% 1997
Total 1911 228 1445 3343 3.29% 6927
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levels are calculated for each year in terms of 1/1,000,000 USD and natural logarithms
of these amounts are calculated thereafter. Table 3 illustrates these calculations
(amounts are in million USD).
(3)              Low-reserve tranche amount = (Low-tranche − Deductible)•3%
        MRRUS = ln(Low-reserve tranche amount/1,000,000)
Table 3. Low-reserve tranche amounts.
Effective date Low-tranche Deductible Difference 3% of Differ. Ln(3% of
Differ.)
23 Dec 04 47.6 7 40.6 1.218 0.1972
22 Dec 05 48.3 7.8 40.5 1.215 0.1947
21 Dec 06 45.8 8.5 37.3 1.119 0.1124
20 Dec 07 43.9 9.3 34.6 1.038 0.0373
01 Jan 09 44.4 10.3 34.1 1.023 0.0227
31 Dec 09 55.2 10.7 44.5 1.335 0.2889
30 Dec 10 58.8 10.7 48.1 1.443 0.3667
29 Dec 11 71 11.5 59.5 1.785 0.5794
27 Dec 12 79.5 12.4 67.1 2.013 0.6996
Data for Government Effectiveness was obtained from World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Indicators page. Worldwide Governance Indicators include six different
indicators for governance of a country, including political and economic governance.
These are Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence,
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.
Government Effectiveness is calculated based on the factors that affect efficient running
of government policies.
In order to be able to make comparisons about the pre-crisis, during crisis and post crisis
periods the whole data is divided into three sub periods. The first sub period contains
the information for the years 2004-2006. The second sub period contains information
for the years 2007-2009, which are considered the worst years of the crisis. Finally,
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third sub period captures the years 2010-2012. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for
each sub period (Non-interest revenue and Net-interest income are in thousands).
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables for three sub periods.
Variables Mean Median Std.D.
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Equity/TA 11.29 11.38 11.59 7.72 7.81 8.35 13.69 15.27 16.36
Long-
term/TA 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.15
Short-
term/TA 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.20 0.21 0.20
Ln(TA) 13.85 14.05 14.15 13.57 13.76 13.86 1.98 2.04 2.04
Ln(Net
Income) 8.67 8.50 8.55 8.41 8.19 8.23 2.25 2.21 2.23
Net Interest
Rev 246 318 360 17.6 19.8 20.3 1547 2097 2417
Non-interest
Inc. 576 599 769.6 15.2 15.8 17.9 3925 4909 6345
LLR/Gross
Loans 1.83 2.18 2.95 1.15 1.39 1.83 3.60 3.28 4.53
Customer
dep/TA 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.22 0.22 0.22
Bank dep/TA 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.16
ROAA 1.04 0.34 0.44 0.57 0.33 0.31 2.93 5.36 4.68
ROAE 9.10 3.98 2.90 7.08 4.66 4.10 15.58 26.86 27.41
GDP growth 2.74 -0.26 1.75 2.66 -0.08 1.80 1.31 3.20 1.54
MRR 1.83 1.80 1.71 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.97 2.07 1.34
Interest rate 2.24 3.07 1.41 1.88 3.44 1.25 1.81 1.53 0.93
Gov. Eff. 1.55 1.46 1.42 1.57 1.57 1.53 0.42 0.45 0.39
Analyzing performance measures show that average ROAA and ROAE have extremely
dropped during crisis period. Although they have shown uptrend in post crisis period,
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they still have not reached to pre crisis positions. Both, average bank deposits and
customer deposits were not affected much by the crisis and stayed stable in post crisis
period. It can be concluded that government interventions have been really useful and
successful during crisis. The ratio of loan loss reserves have increased after crisis, which
means that there have been significant amount of customers who failed during crisis.
Consequently, this affected banks’ worsening performance measures in post crisis
period.
Macroeconomic indicators have worsened during crisis and they are still suffering from
the consequences of it. GDP growth has fallen below zero during crisis for the countries
included in sample. It has turned to positive after crisis but has not reached to pre crisis
levels  yet.  Interest  rates  have  risen  and  fallen  sharply  during  crisis  and  after  crisis
respectively. This has been due to the immediate reaction to crisis and rapid intervention
of  governments  to  liven  up  the  economies  in  post  crisis  period.  Analysis  of  average
measures let to conclude that banking industry has been suffered by the crisis
significantly. However, immediate responses and acts to prevent crisis has avoided its
further spreading and possible long lasting effect on economies.
5.3. Methodology description
The methodology applied in this study is fixed effects panel (unbalanced) estimation
with OLS estimator for variable coefficients. According to the assumptions of fixed
effects method there is always non-changing unexplained factor (ai) for all cross-
sections of panel data across time. Therefore, using fixed effects method eliminates
these non –changing factors (ai) and lets to get unbiased and reliable results for
estimators. Obviously from the nature of fixed effects method it is impossible to use
dummy variables in regression. Therefore, for this study it is stated that the fixed effects
method will eliminate any country specific and bank type specific factors. Fixed effects
method also assumes that slope coefficient for each cross-section is not changing
through time. Accordingly, eliminating fixed effects across cross-sections also
eliminates these slope coefficients (β0). Simply fixed effects method takes the first
difference of equations (4) and (5) in order to cancel unobserved effects (ai).
(4) ݕ௜௧ = 	 ߚଵ • ݔ௜௧ + 	 ܽ௜ + 	 ݑ௜௧, t = 1, 2, … T
(5) ݕത௜ = 	 ߚଵ • ̅ݔ௜ + 	 ܽ௜ + 	ݑത௜
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After taking the difference of these two equations ai, which do not differ through time,
will be eliminated. New model will look like as follows:
(6) ݕ௜௧ −	ݕത௜ 	= 	 ߚଵ • (ݔ௜௧ −	 ̅ݔ௜) + 	(ݑ௜௧ −	ݑത௜)
or
(7) ̇ݕ௜௧ = 	 ߚଵ • 	 ̇ݔ௜௧ + 	 ̇ݑ௜௧
For this study it is also assumed that all error terms through cross-sections in different
time periods are not correlated with one another, i.e. Cov [ ̇ݑ௜௧ , ̇ݑ௜௦ | ܺ̇௜, ܽ௜ ] = 0 for all
t ≠ s. Since some cross-sections do not contain full information for all variables the data
used in this study is unbalanced panel data. The range of periods varies from 2004 to
2012. Full data occupies 62343 cross-sections for 9627 individual banks across
countries.
In order to check the first hypothesis, how the crisis affected banks’ capital structure
generally the following regression has been run:
(8)        Equity/Total Assets = β0 + β1•(Proxy for Crisis) + β2•(Control Variables) + u
where,
Equity/Total Assets is the ratio of banks’ total equity to total assets,
Proxy for crisis is either GDP growth, ROAA or ROAE,
Control variables are the variables discussed in the first section of this chapter except
the variables which belong to proxies for crisis.
GDP growth is the best indicator of crisis in macroeconomic terms. Therefore, it will
measure how macroeconomic instabilities affected banks’ capital structure choice.
However, GDP growth can reflect the whole economy’s impact on banks’ capital
choice. On the other hand more quick reaction to financial crisis derives from banks’
previous performance. Therefore ROAA and ROAE are employed in this regression in
order to support  the results obtained from the regression with GDP growth. If  they do
not support the results of the regression with GDP growth then the latter is assumed to
have best explanatory capacity.
The second hypothesis will be tested with the following two regression models:
(9)        Deposits and Short-term funding /Total Assets = β0 + β1•(Proxy for Crisis) +
β2•(Control Variables) + u
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(10)      Long-term  funding/Total  Assets  =  β0 +  β1•(Proxy for Crisis) + β2•(Control
Variables) + u
Since deposits are also considered as short-term liabilities for banks they are also
included in the regression in order to test the dynamics of short-term liabilities around
crisis. The explanatory variables are the same that used for the test of the first
hypothesis.  However,  only  the  results  from  the  regression  with  GDP  growth  will  be
reported. Hence, these results will best describe the dynamics of short-term and long –
term liabilities.
In order to test the third hypothesis whether the Scandinavian countries performed better
than others in this sample regression (8) is applied for Scandinavian countries and other
countries separately. Scandinavian countries include Denmark, Norway, Sweden and
Finland. Although Iceland is also considered as a Scandinavian country historically, for
this test it is not included for the sample with others. This is because Iceland had a
severe banking crisis during 2008-2011 and the country’s banks have suffered much
from this. Therefore, including Iceland to this sample may lead to biased results for the
whole Scandinavian sample. Furthermore, the data with other countries do not cover US
banks. The need for not including them in the sample arises from the fact that US banks
suffered from the crisis first and worst. Moreover the results will be more consistent if
the banks of the same economic and geographic region are compared to one another.
Mainly for these reasons US banks are kept aside for the test of third hypothesis.
For first three regressions sample data is divided into three periods: 2004-2006, 2007-
2009, and 2010-2012. The first period reflects the conditions and situation prior to the
crisis. The second period will let to conclude about the dynamics during crisis. Finally,
the last period will draw the image of banks for post-crisis period. Splitting the data into
three sub periods allows to make conclusions whether the crisis affected bank capital
and funding structure in different periods of economic cycle.
In order to test fourth hypothesis plain vanilla OLS regression has been applied for each
year from 2007 to 2011 for every country separately. The following regression model
has been employed for this test:
(11)      (Lt+1-Lt) / Lt = β0 + β1•ROAAt + β2•(Control Variablest) + ut
The dependent variable (Lt+1-Lt)  /  Lt is  the  change  in  Equity  /  Total  Assets  ratio
compared to previous year. All explanatory variables are observations for the current
year. Goal of this regression is to discover the impact of ROAA to the changes in capital
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structure by years. Since GDP growth is not changing within a year it cannot be used as
proxy for crisis. Other macroeconomic variables are not included in the model as
control variables as well.
Beta coefficients (standardized coefficients). Along with normal coefficients
standardized coefficients will also be used in order to interpret the regression results.
Therefore, it is important to briefly explain how the standardized coefficients of beta
coefficients are obtained. Beta coefficients explain how a dependent variable is changed
if one independent variable increases by one standard deviation, ceteris paribus. If it is
assumed that all independent variables change at the same time, i.e. no ceteris paribus,
then total effect of changes can be calculated with beta coefficients. In order to obtain
beta coefficients the following steps are followed:
(12) ݕ௜ = ߚመ଴ + 	ߚመଵ • ݔ௜ଵ + 	ߚመଶ • ݔ௜ଶ +⋯ߚመ௞ • ݔ௜௞ + 	ݑො௜
Take the average values by subtracting the means of dependent and independent
variables and error term, average value of error term is zero.
(13) ݕ௜ − ݕത = 	 ߚመଵ • (ݔ௜ଵ − ̅ݔଵ) + 	ߚመଶ • (ݔ௜ଶ − ̅ݔଶ) +⋯+ ߚመ௞ • (ݔ௜௞ − ̅ݔ௞) + 	 ݑො௜
By dividing each side of the equation with the standard deviation of dependent variable
and then for each independent variable multiplying and dividing with their
corresponding standard deviation we obtain new beta coefficients:
(14) ௬೔ି௬ത
ఙෝ೤
= ఙෝೣభ
ఙෝ೤
ߚመଵ • (ݔ௜ଵ − ̅ݔଵ) + 	ఙෝೣమఙෝ೤ ߚመଶ • (ݔ௜ଶ − ̅ݔଶ) +⋯+ ఙෝೣೖఙෝ೤ ߚመ௞ • (ݔ௜௞ − ̅ݔ௞) + 	 ௨ෝ೔ఙෝ೤
The term (ߪො௫ೖ ߪො௬൘ ) • ߚመ௞ explains how the dependent variable changes when the
independent variable xk increases by one standard deviation.
The results of all abovementioned regressions are reported in the next chapter.
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter summarizes the results and interpretations of the empirical tests. The first
section of the chapter illustrates the interpretation of empirical test of the first
hypothesis. The second section explains empirical results of the tests with the short-term
and long-term funding around the crisis. Finally, the last section illustrates the
comparison of bank capital structure dynamics in Scandinavian and other European
countries.
6.1. Dynamics of the capital structure
Table 5 reports the results of the regression model described in formula (8) for the
whole sample. Results reported in the first three columns represent the output with the
GDP  growth  as  the  proxy  for  financial  crisis.  Results  in  the  next  three  and  last  three
columns represent outputs from regressions with ROAA and ROAE as proxies for crisis
respectively. The bottom part of the table provides information about the observations
for total unbalanced panels and results of the F-statistic for the whole model. Basically,
the table reports how different factors affected bank capital structure around crisis with
main focus on GDP growth, ROAA and ROAE.
First of all, it is important to pay attention to ln(TA) variable. This variable reports how
bank’s size might affect its capital structure. In order to prevent unbiased results and
maintain normal distribution natural logarithm of Total Assets is taken instead of using
Total Assets. The results from all regressions report that ln(TA) has a negative impact
on bank capital structure. If asset growth is maintained by attracting more deposits and
other funding sources negative effect of this variable is understandable. Hence, rising
weight of liabilities in bank’s balance sheet will lead capital ratio to decrease.
Moreover, it can also be concluded that the larger a bank is the lower its capital ratio.
Although their sample occupies only US banks, this finding contradicts to Berger et al.
(2008) findings about capital ratios in large US BHCs. However, the findings are
consistent with Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) findings about BHCs.
The  second  coefficient  ln(Net  Income)  is  also  statistically  significant  for  most  of  the
regressions. By observing the dynamics of the coefficients through three periods it can
be seen that they have declined very sharply during other two periods compared to
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2004-2006. Since net income is a measure of profitability, the coefficients of this
variable lead to conclude that profitable banks tend to hold more capital. The results
show that better performance in banks lead to higher capital ratio during all periods of
economic cycles. Most of the coefficients are statistically significant which lets to
affirm the positive impact of performance on bank capital structure.
Empirical evidence provided by the variable LLR/Gross loans is not as strong as other
variables. However, two of the regressions provide the same evidence for this
coefficient. Hence, the results show that loan loss reserves have a positive impact on
capital ratio. This attitude might be triggered by two reasons. First, regulations require
banks to hold more reserves for higher loan losses. Secondly, banks might be interested
in holding more reserves themselves, in order to prevent possible loan losses. This ratio
can be also treated as a measure of bad performance. Therefore, the findings from Net
Income and Loan Loss Reserve lead to conclude that both good and bad performance
have a positive impact on bank capital ratio. However, the finding with bad
performance is not as strong as with good performance.
Customer deposits as an integral part of bank assets affect capital ratio negatively. All
of the coefficients are statistically significant in 1-10% significance levels. The
empirical evidence shows that the more banks have customer deposits the less they hold
capital. Since, customer deposits occupy significant proportion of total assets they can
be interpreted as a bank size measure as well. Therefore, the findings of the empirical
tests with customer deposits support the findings with total assets that large banks tend
to hold lower capital ratio under all economic conditions. The coefficients of bank
deposit ratios are highly statistically significant in all regressions except for the first
periods. These results once more support the findings from Total Assets and Customer
Deposits variables. According to the empirical results deposits from banks decrease
capital ratio, hence they have a negative impact.
The next two variables, non-interest income and net-interest income, provide little
empirical evidence. Only non-interest income coefficients are statistically significant
during the period prior to the crisis. The results show that before the crisis non-interest
income had very small positive impact on capital ratio. These findings let to conclude
about the impact of bank type to capital ratio. Hence, they lead to state that before the
crisis banks affiliated with non-traditional banking activities held more capital than
those affiliated with traditional activities. However, this statement is not supported by
strong evidence.
79
Interest rate variable is highly statistically significant for the periods during and after
crisis through most of the regressions. According to the results interest rates affect bank
capital ratio negatively. This might be mainly because rising interest rates prevent banks
from growing and lower or smooth their share values. The effect is negative through all
periods of economic cycle which lets to conclude about the persistence of the negative
impact. Finally, the last variable, government effectiveness, is statistically significant
only during economic crisis period. Apparently, bank capital ratio is not affected by the
governance during good times. During economic downturns, good governance
decreases capital ratio. This might be mainly because the applied economic and public
policy during economic downturns that helps banks to grow. The growth leads to lower
capital ratios as it was suggested by the findings with total assets variable. However,
this finding is not supported by strong evidence.
As proxies for crisis ROAA and GDP growth provide contradicting evidence for the
post crisis period. However, ROAA is mainly a bank performance measure; therefore it
basically helps to conclude how good performance affects bank capital ratio.
Apparently, good performance has a positive impact on capital ratio. This evidence is
consistent with the findings from Net Income variable. As a performance measure net
income provides strong evidence about a positive relation between performance and
capital ratio which is supported by ROAA coefficients as well. On the other hand, GDP
growth coefficients illustrate more accurate information about the impact of crisis on
bank capital. GDP growth coefficients mainly prove the first hypothesis of this thesis.
Hence, GDP growth had a positive impact on capital ratio prior to crisis and the impact
turned to negative in post crisis period. According to these results banks tend to increase
their capital under good economic conditions. Raising capital is not costly during
economic expansion as suggested by theories and previous empirical research. On the
other hand during crises and post crisis periods raising capital becomes costly process.
Negative impact of GDP growth variable in the post crisis period is a result of the long
lasting consequences of the crisis. These findings mainly provide sufficient evidence for
accepting the first hypothesis and achieve one of the purposes of the thesis.
Along with these regressions the regressions with the differences has been carried out in
order to test robustness of the results. First differences of variables except GDP growth,
MRR and Interest rate have been used in the regressions. Since GDP growth is already
attributed in changes and MRR and Interest rate do not change much through observed
years the changes have not been used for these variables. The results of these
regressions firmly support the findings for the variable Total Assets. The coefficients
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are all negative and statistically significant through each period. Other variables are not
statistically significant in the regressions with the differences.
Table 6 reports how one standard deviation change in significant variables affects
average capital ratio in different periods. Only the regressions with GDP growth are
interpreted. Averages are calculated by multiplying each significant coefficient with its
mean for the corresponding period. Standard deviation changes are calculated as
described in the formula (14). Percentage changes are calculated as the percentage
deviations from average Equity/Total Assets ratio.
Table 6. Impact of 1 standard deviation increase on capital ratio.
04-06 07-09 10-12
s.dev
change % change
s.dev
change % change
s.dev
change % change
Ln(TA) -0.8327 -8.99% -0.8446 -8.22% -0.7380 -10.19%
Ln(NetIncome) 0.1952 1.93% 0.0697 0.63% 0.0339 0.42%
LLR/Gross
Loans 0.0736 0.73%
Customer
dep/TA -0.1742 -1.76% -0.1363 -1.24% -0.2129 -2.74%
Bank dep/TA -0.0703 -0.64% -0.1379 -1.76%
Non-interest Inc 0.0076 0.08%
Net Interest Inc
ROAA
ROAE
GDP Growth 0.0325 0.32% -0.0321 -0.40%
MRR 0.0578 0.72%
Interest Rate -0.0376 -0.34% -0.0872 -1.10%
Gov. Eff. -0.0281 -0.25%
Constant 84.9431 105.4137 103.5058
Average E/TA 10.0969 11.1201 7.9819
According to the Table 6 before the crisis a negative impact of one standard deviation
increase of total assets on capital ratio was 8.99%. The impact has decreased slightly
during the crisis and increased significantly after the crisis. Positive impact of net
income has decreased from 1.93% to 0.63% during crisis and continued decreasing in
post crisis period. Before the crisis one standard deviation increase in Loan loss
reserves/Gross loans ratio have been increasing average capital ratio by 0.73%. The
impact of one standard deviation in Customer deposits/Total assets and Bank
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deposits/Total assets ratios have also increased after the crisis. Before the crisis one
standard deviation increase in GDP growth was leading to 0.32% increase in average
capital ratio. However, in the post crisis period it leads to 0.40% decrease in average
capital ratio. Negative impact of interest rates has also increased in post crisis period.
6.2. Dynamics of funding structure
Table  7  reports  the  results  of  the  regression  (8)  with  dependent  variables  Short-term
Liabilities / Total Assets and Long-term liabilities / Total Assets (left side and right side
respectively).  The results from regression with only GDP growth as a proxy for crisis
are reported because ROAA regressions have the same outcomes and ROAE
regressions are not helpful in explaining the dependent variables. GDP growth column
is highlighted in the table in order to focus the attention to the most important
explanatory variable of the regressions.
According to the results Total Assets have a positive impact on both short-term and
long-term funding. However, the positive impact is significant during certain periods.
The coefficient of Total Assets is highly statistically significant during crisis time,
which leads to conclude that larger banks had more short-term funding than smaller
banks during crisis. Identically, it can be concluded that larger banks had more long-
term funding during recovery period. It is not possible to conclude about how different
types of funding are affected by bank size, however apparently they are not affected by
the size under good economic conditions.
Net income as a reward for good performance affects funding structure only during
economic downturns. According to the results higher income increases short-term
funding and decreases long-term funding. This finding is reasonable in the sense that
better performance creates more public assurance and helps to attract more deposits.
Since deposits (short-term funding) are core source of funding for most banks this
finding is fair enough.
The impact of customer deposits and bank deposits on both type of funding is persistent
through all periods of economic cycle. They have a positive impact on short-term
funding and negative impact on long-term funding. Since customer deposits and bank
deposits mainly have relatively shorter period of maturity compared to other sources of
funding these findings are also reasonable.
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Table 7. Dynamics of short-term and long-term liabilities.
Proxy for crisis: GDP growth
Dependent
variable: Short-term / TA Long-term / TA
Sub periods: 04-06 07-09 10-12  04-06 07-09 10-12
Ln(TA) 0.0106*
(0.0868)
0.0516***
(0.0000)
-0.0007
(0.9779)
0.0388
(0.1886)
-0.0018
(0.9237)
0.0524**
(0.0316)
Ln(NetIncome) 0.0006
(0.7659)
0.0026*
(0.0521)
-0.0005
(0.8391)
-0.0066
(0.3609)
-0.0045**
(0.0272)
-0.0019
(0.4661)
LLR/Gross
Loans -0.0003
(0.4952)
-0.0022
(0.1527)
0.0026**
(0.0240)
-0.0027
(0.0783)
0.0033*
(0.0697)
-0.0034
(0.2080)
Customer
dep/TA 0.9096***
(0.0000)
0.8613***
(0.0000)
0.8153***
(0.0000)
-0.6858***
(0.0000)
-0.5297***
(0.0000)
-0.5026***
(0.0003)
Bank dep/TA 0.9435***
(0.0000)
0.8173***
(0.0000)
0.9526***
(0.0000)
-0.7935***
(0.0000)
-0.5384***
(0.0000)
-0.7080***
(0.0001)
Non-interest
Inc 0.0000
(0.6572)
0.0000
(0.3187)
0.0000*
(0.0569)
0.0000
(0.5035)
0.0000**
(0.0268)
0.0000
(0.5756)
Net Interest Inc 0.0000
(0.7441)
0.0000
(0.3584)
0.0000
(0.7398)
0.0000
(0.7464)
0.0000**
(0.0298)
0.0000
(0.6931)
GDP Growth -0.0031**
(0.0327)
-0.0022***
(0.0001)
-0.0044***
(0.0020)
0.0028
(0.2756)
0.0034***
(0.0000)
0.0093***
(0.0000)
MRR -0.0026
(0.1181)
0.0034*
(0.0904)
-0.0180***
(0.0000)
0.0011
(0.8381)
-0.0034
(0.2204)
0.0117**
(0.0463)
Interest Rate -0.0021
(0.1443)
-0.0001
(0.9619)
0.0350***
(0.0004)
0.0013
(0.5218)
0.0007
(0.7137)
-0.0214*
(0.0737)
Gov. Eff. 0.0400***
(0.0001)
-0.0826***
(0.0000)
-0.0846***
(0.0011)
-0.0504***
(0.0000)
0.1465***
(0.0000)
0.0575**
(0.0386)
Constant -0.1165
(0.2323)
-0.5656***
(0.0001)
0.2473
(0.3131)
0.2046
(0.5415)
0.4278
(0.1451)
-0.3266
(0.3129)
Observations 2251 3542 5254  2042 3248 2493
F-statistic 71.1456 85.2176 16.5327  34.1633 46.7779 10.8303
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* Significant in 10% level
** Significant in 5% level
*** Significant in 1% level
Next two income measures have statistically significant positive impact on long-term
funding  only  for  the  crisis  time.  Along  with  being  measures  of  income  these  two
variables can also be interpreted for distinguishing between traditional and innovative
banking activities. Therefore, it can be concluded that independently from the nature of
their activities additional income during the crises had affected long-term funding
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positively. This finding is contradicting to the finding with net income variable if all
three variables are interpreted as performance measures.
Apparently, none of the funding is affected by the conditions in the economy. The
impact of GDP growth is always negative for the short-term funding and positive for the
long-term funding. These results do not let to conclude how the crisis affected funding
structure of banks; therefore the impact of the crisis will be discussed with the standard
deviation change in the following paragraphs. The findings with the MRR and Interest
rate suggest that macroeconomic conditions during and after the crisis were in favor of
short-term funding. Hence, MRR affects short-term funding positively during the crisis
while it is supposed to affect it negatively. The conditions turn to normal for MRR after
the crisis. While Interest rates during post crisis period help to increase short-term
funding, MRR help increase long-term funding for the same period. However, the
statistical tests applied in this study do not allow controlling which of them adds more
value for the contributed sources of funding.
Table 8. Impact of 1 standard deviation increase on short-term and long-term funding.
Short-term/TA Long-term/TA
2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012
% change % change % change % change % change % change
Ln(TA) 11.08% 68.25% 174.12%
Ln(NetIncome) 3.73% -23.61%
LLR/Gross Loans 10.39% 25.71%
Customer dep/TA 104.07% 122.49% 154.57% -147.23% -275.26% -177.51%
Bank dep/TA 86.98% 93.56% 136.05% -137.25% -225.25% -188.37%
Non-interest Inc 3.38% 12.34%
Net Interest Inc 13.73%
GDP Growth -2.17% -4.87% -6.24% 25.82% 23.33%
MRR 4.62% -26.88% 25.62%
Interest Rate 28.50% -32.44%
Gov. Eff. 8.98% -31.38% -41.19% -21.23% 154.77% 36.95%
Average Sh-t/TA 0.93 0.74 0.56 -0.65 -0.23 0.40
Finally, the interpretation of Government Effectiveness variable let to conclude that
before the crisis government policies were in favor of short-term funding, whereas they
started working in favor of long-term funding during and after crisis. The robustness
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tests with the differences of variables affirm the results for customer deposits, bank
deposits and non interest income variables. Other variables are not statistically
significant in the regressions with differences.
Table 8 illustrates how 1 standard deviation increase in statistically significant variables
can change average short-term and long-term funding. According to the table the
standard deviation increase in almost all variables caused extremely high changes, either
increase or decrease, in the average funding structure during the crisis time. Customer
deposits and bank deposits were two crucial variables for the changes in long-term
funding during the crisis. On the other hand, short-term funding reacts to the changes in
those variables more moderately during all periods of economic cycle: the impact
increases harmonically. While size factor (Total Assets) has been affecting short-term
funding during the crisis more strongly, it has significantly large impact on long-term
funding in post-crisis period. The findings from Table 7 and the results from Table 8
mainly allow to accept the second hypothesis of the thesis about the changing patterns
of the funding structure of banks around the crisis.
6.3. Empirical tests of further hypotheses
Table 9 reports the results of the regression (8) for Scandinavian and European
countries included in the whole sample. Scandinavian countries contain Denmark,
Norway, Sweden and Finland. The results of the regressions for both geographic areas
are identical to the results of the whole sample. Total assets have a negative impact on
capital ratio and most of the variables are highly statistically significant. This negative
impact has also been affirmed by other regressions with the differences. The negative
impact of the size to capital ratio is persistent through all regressions. Net income has a
positive impact as in the test with the whole sample. Customer deposits and bank
deposits have a negative impact on capital structure in both geographical regions.
However, they are not highly significant for Scandinavian countries.
GDP  growth  coefficient,  proxy  for  the  periods  of  economic  cycle,  is  positive  for  the
Scandinavian countries during the crisis. It is negative in the post crisis period as in the
regressions  with  the  whole  sample.  It  is  interesting  to  mention  that  the  coefficient  of
GDP growth for the Scandinavian countries is positive, while it is only positive for
other European countries and for the whole sample during the period prior to the crisis.
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This might lead to conclude that economic conditions in the Scandinavian countries
were not harsh during the crisis and the reaction of bank capital ratios to them was
Table 9. Comparison of Scandinavian and European countries.
Proxy for crisis: GDP growth
Dependent
variable: Equity / TA Equity / TA
Geographic
area: Scandinavian countries Other European countries
Sub periods: 04-06 07-09 10-12  04-06 07-09 10-12
Ln(TA) -3.9022
(0.2672)
-3.2789
(0.1680)
-1.7442**
(0.0480)
-6.1085***
(0.0001)
-6.5498***
(0.0000)
-5.2789***
(0.0011)
Ln(NetIncome) 0.8525*
(0.0907)
0.3267
(0.2005)
0.1760
(0.2008)
1.2098***
(0.0041)
0.4731***
(0.0000)
0.2624***
(0.0029)
LLR/Gross
Loans 0.3144
(0.3456)
0.7007
(0.2491)
0.1063
(0.6666)
0.2830*
(0.0902)
0.1539
(0.4340)
0.0204
(0.8799)
Customer
dep/TA -45.6159*
(0.0846)
-3.8143
(0.7073)
2.9899
(0.2952)
-10.9873*
(0.0546)
-9.5581***
(0.0041)
-11.0148
(0.1043)
Bank dep/TA -34.7404*
(0.0918)
2.2351
(0.7996)
-4.4114
(0.1941)
-7.0575
(0.3945)
-5.9537**
(0.0152)
-12.177***
(0.0009)
Non-interest
Inc 0.0000
(0.2604)
0.0000
(0.3715)
0.0000
(0.9627)
0.0000***
(0.0040)
0.0000*
(0.0686)
0.0000
(0.6471)
Net Interest Inc 0.0000
(0.2359)
0.0000
(0.2420)
0.0000
(0.7243)
0.0000
(0.3927)
0.0000**
(0.0503)
0.0000
(0.3645)
GDP Growth 0.5315
(0.2659)
0.2277**
(0.0448)
-0.1075*
(0.0929)
0.3897***
(0.0051)
-0.0431
(0.1127)
-0.2119***
(0.0002)
Interest Rate 0.8291
(0.4500)
-0.3550
(0.1263)
-0.4795**
(0.0244)
-0.2109
(0.1805)
-0.3096***
(0.0000)
-0.5976***
(0.0003)
Gov. Eff. -6.5951**
(0.0166)
3.7974*
(0.0871)
1.3706
(0.2737)
0.6210
(0.1717)
-1.5245***
(0.0072)
1.0403
(0.5021)
Constant 98.8133
(0.1226)
49.8605
(0.1468)
29.7054**
(0.0256)
89.7553***
(0.0000)
108.0397***
(0.0000)
89.6122***
(0.0013)
Observations 174 202 292  2072 3053 3960
F-statistic 48.2141 33.6417 147.2799  46.1841 66.1019 46.4623
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* Significant in 10% level
** Significant in 5% level
*** Significant in 1% level
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similar to the period prior to the crisis. However, the impact changes to negative in post
crisis period which means that long lasting recession ultimately affected Scandinavian
banks  as  well.  In  other  words,  even  if  the  Scandinavian  banks  were  prepared  for  the
crisis, its long lasting effect has influenced them as well.
Interest rates have negative impact on capital ratio in both sub groups. According to the
results government effectiveness had a negative impact on capital ratio of Scandinavian
banks prior to the crisis. This variable has contradicting impact on two different sub
groups during the crisis: it is positive for the Scandinavian countries and negative for
other European countries. Apparently, policies applied during the crisis helped to
increase the capital of banks in Scandinavian countries, while it was not helpful in other
European countries. This finding supports the finding with the GDP growth variable.
Table 10 illustrates the impact of standard deviation increase in variables on capital
ratio in two different sub groups. According to the table a positive impact of a standard
deviation increase is smaller and a negative impact is larger for Scandinavian countries.
One standard deviation increase in GDP growth during the crisis caused 0.87% increase
in average capital ratio. This number is larger than the 0.36% increase for the European
countries for the period prior to the crisis. Apparently, Scandinavian banks were able to
maintain higher capital ratios during the crisis. Mainly these results from table 10
support the findings from table 9 and prove the third hypothesis of this thesis.
Table 10. Impact of 1 standard deviation increase on capital ratio.
Scandinavian countries Other European countries
2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012
% change % change % change % change % change % change
Ln(TA) -5.02% -8.62% -8.78% -4.64%
Ln(NetIncome) 0.37% 1.94% 0.69% 0.25%
LLR/Gross Loans 0.73%
Customer dep/TA -1.92% -1.69% -1.38%
Bank dep/TA -1.18% -0.69% -0.86%
Non-interest Inc 0.22% 0.18%
Net Interest Inc 0.12%
GDP Growth 0.87% -0.23% 0.36% -0.14%
Interest Rate -0.63% -0.31% -0.24%
Gov. Eff. 0.54% 2.02% -0.45%
Average Sh-t/TA -37.62 5.48 4.33 10.27 9.96 14.18
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In order to test the fourth hypothesis of the thesis the regression model described in
formula (11) have been applied to several selected countries with the sufficient number
of observations from the year 2007 to 2010. The regression results provide only little
sufficient information. Therefore, it is not possible to make conclusions and to apply
those findings to general sample. The fourth hypothesis of the thesis has not been
proved because of the lack of information. Other three hypotheses have been accepted
with sufficient empirical evidence.
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Financial crisis of late 2000s raised a lot of questions in the efficiency of bank
regulation and regulation of financial system as a whole. Since banks are more entwined
with economy and wealth of people compared to any other time in the history, scholars,
governments and general public became more interested in efficient bank regulation and
supervision. Therefore, the problems addressed in this thesis are interesting to
investigate in the light of the recent financial crisis.
Because of the importance of the topic this thesis focuses on the dynamics of bank
capital and funding structure around latest financial crisis. Moreover, the thesis
investigates the impact of the crisis on the group of four Scandinavian countries and
compares it to the whole sample (excluding the US). The purpose of this comparison is
to find differences in capital structure choice of banks in these countries and draw
conclusions about better policies.
The data used in this study contains banks from the US, UK and 26 European countries:
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden and Switzerland. The whole sample includes 6927 individual banks from these
countries. Sample period captures years from 2004 to 2012 and divided into three sub
periods: pre crisis, crisis and post crisis. The first period contains years 2004-2006, the
second 2007-2009 and the third 2010-2012.
Fixed effects panel estimation with OLS estimator for variable coefficients is employed
in order to execute empirical tests. Fixed effects panel estimation assumes that there are
always unobserved non-changing factors affecting output through cross-sections and it
eliminates them in order to prevent biased results. Therefore, dummy variables are not
used for empirical tests and country specific and firm specific factors are assumed to be
eliminated.
The findings from the regressions with the capital ratio as a dependent variable mainly
prove the first hypothesis of this thesis. As a proxy for the different periods of economic
cycle GDP growth provides sufficient empirical evidence. Hence it had a positive
impact on capital ratio prior to crisis and the impact turned to negative in post crisis
period. According to these results banks tend to increase their capital under good
economic conditions. Raising capital is not costly during economic expansion as
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suggested by theories and previous empirical research. On the other hand, during crises
and post crisis periods raising capital becomes costly process. Negative impact of GDP
growth variable in the post crisis period is a result of the long lasting consequences of
the crisis. Other findings suggest that bank size, short-term funding (customer deposits
and bank deposits) and interest rates have a negative impact on the capital ratio in all
times. Net income and non-interest income have a positive impact on the capital ratio.
Loan loss reserves also have a positive impact on the capital ratio; however it is
significant only during good economic conditions.
Findings from the regressions with short-term and long-term funding suggest that the
crisis has mainly affected long-term funding of banks. This finding is supported by
theory and previous research as well. Hence, during crisis uncertainty about the future
makes difficult to receive long-term funding. It also makes short-term funding more
costly. The empirical findings also suggest that before the crisis government policy was
supporting short-term funding of banks. However, during and after crisis the policies
turned in favor of long-term funding. Apparently, governments became more interested
in sustainability of bank funding. Since, Scandinavian banks outperformed during the
crisis their practices can be learned and applied in other countries. However, it is
important to take into account local conditions in those countries. Therefore, in order to
apply their banking practices in other countries efficiently not only bank specific
practices but also country governance practices must be taken into account.
Finally, empirical findings from the regressions with Scandinavian countries suggest
that, these countries suffered less from the crisis. Hence, GDP gross variable has a
positive impact on capital ratio for Scandinavian banks during the crisis. This impact is
positive for the whole sample only during the period prior to the crisis and statistically
equal to zero during the crisis. Therefore, the conclusion can be made about better
capital ratios of Scandinavian banks during the crisis. Moreover, the effectiveness of
government policies has also outperformed in Scandinavian countries during the crisis.
Mainly, capital structure of the banks of Scandinavian countries suffered less from the
crisis.
This thesis is mainly contributing to the existing literature by investigating the patterns
of capital and funding structure of 29 EU/EFTA countries and the USA banks around
latest financial crisis. A study for such a wider sample around latest crisis has not been
conducted yet. Moreover, it contributes to the existing literature by making comparisons
between Scandinavian and other countries. The thesis finds sufficient evidence in favor
of Scandinavian banks.
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As stated in the first chapter major limitation of the thesis is the applied methodology.
The  fixed  effects  panel  estimation  applied  in  the  thesis  does  not  allow  to  control  for
country specific, bank specific and other factors because dummy variables are not
applicable for this estimation method. Another limitation of the thesis is the
geographical area of sample countries. Since the sample includes countries only from
Europe and the US general conclusions for all banks of the world cannot be made with
the findings of this thesis. It is important to extend sample and include at least
significant countries from each continents to draw general conclusions for the dynamics
of bank capital structure around crises. The countries can be divided into different
groups due to the level of their development. It is important to apply more advanced
empirical  methods,  such  as  GMM  dynamic  panel  estimation  in  order  to  get  more
accurate empirical evidence. This method will give a chance to control for country
specific and bank specific factors, e.g. bank size, as well.
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